Across the United States, the classic model of monopoly, investor-owned utilities (IOUs) is failing to provide affordable, clean, and reliable electricity. In New Mexico, these challenges are compounded by a regulatory system that frequently sidesteps everyday consumers’ priorities due to backroom deals cut by utilities, decision-makers, and special interest groups. And the result is a system that fails to deliver on the goal of cheaper, cleaner energy for all.
For this episode of the Local Energy Rules Podcast, host John Farrell is joined by Stephen Fischmann – former chair of the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission and former New Mexico state senator.
Listen to the full episode and explore more resources below — including a transcript and summary of the episode.
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Stephen Fischmann:
I don’t even want to get into all the obfuscation that goes on. That one just drives me crazy — why a utility gets a 10% return for very little risk. Any other business out there on the market can expect 6 or 7% return and they’ve got competition and risk and all kinds of stuff going on. It just floors me.
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John Farrell:
The current US electricity system works like a classic monopoly shakedown where incumbent monopoly utilities squeeze out extra profits for simply doing the job. Instead, we need public ownership of electricity, transmission and distribution along with good oversight of competitive power generation. That’s the take from our well-informed guest, Stephen Fischman, who previously worked on utility sector legislation as a state senator and served as chair of the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission overseeing the state’s InvestOne Utilities. I’m John Farrell, director of the Energy Democracy Initiative at the Institute for Local Self-Reliance, and this is Local Energy Rules, a podcast about monopoly, power, energy, democracy, and how communities can take charge to transform the energy system. Stephen, welcome to Local Energy Rules.
Stephen Fischmann:
Thanks so much for having me.
John Farrell:
I love to ask my guests kind of how they got into these issues. Could you just tell us a little bit about your background? How did you get on a career path in politics and utility regulation?
Stephen Fischmann:
Well, in school I never even ran for any kind of school office. I worked for Levi Strauss, the jeans company, after I got out of grad school, worked there for a long time. Then when I retired to New Mexico, there was just a lot of buzz at that time around energy and global warming issues. So I got interested and started the Southwest Energy Alliance in Southern New Mexico to push on certain clean energy policies. I ran for state senate, got elected, served a term there. When you’re a legislator, everything’s a mile wide and an inch deep, and I’m more a mile deep, inch wide kind of person. I ended up running for the public regulation commission where I could dig deeper into specific policies and work on energy. So that’s what I did there and that’s how I got involved.
John Farrell:
Very good. I love that idea of wanting to be a mile deep. Sometimes I feel like I want to be both a mile wide and a mile deep and it makes my head spin.
Stephen Fischmann:
We all want to be Superman.
John Farrell:
Yeah, for sure. So one of the things that I think you’re just very well suited to because of your background here is to help examine this design that we have for our electricity system. I think there’s a pretty broad consensus that having monopoly investor owned utilities provide electricity service is failing to provide affordable and clean electricity writ large. But I guess I’m kind of curious if you want to talk a little bit about other consequences of this and what is maybe about this state regulatory process that you obviously were intimately involved with that is coming up short for the public.
Stephen Fischmann:
Well, I’ll speak specifically to New Mexico, but I think it’s a broader problem is that the general public doesn’t get well represented in the process, at least my experience. In New Mexico and what I’ve seen in other jurisdictions is that there are interest groups that get involved and have very specific agendas and somewhere in that whole picture just the average consumer often gets overlooked. In New Mexico, the attorney general is supposed to be representing the rate payer, if you will. There’s no group that intervenes in New Mexico that is specifically a rate payers group. There’s environmental groups, there’s utilities, and the result is that a lot of deals get cut, if you will, that kind of work around that core rate payer consumer concept. And I think that leads to solutions that oftentimes are kind of lopsided. They don’t take into consideration the broad set of deeds that people face and affordability is a huge one. My personal belief is affordability is a huge factor in the success of clean and renewable energy. If we keep cutting deals that cost more money, the public’s going to get pretty pissed off and we don’t need that. We need ’em to see that clean is affordable and then they continue to support the direction. But if clean is expensive, you lose a lot of people and progress gets slower.
John Farrell:
I’m kind of curious if part of what you’re referencing there about cutting deals is similar to what I’ve experienced in Minnesota where we have maybe these broad regulatory proceedings about a utility resource plan. So the purpose of this is to say, okay, over the next 15 years, what does the utility think is going to be needed to create a reliable electricity system and an affordable electricity system? And they bring forward their proposal, the interest groups and folks are all involved in that and they file comments and participate in the process. The commissioners are listening to those comments and then often what seems to happen is that there’s some sort of deal as you referenced, there’s some sort of negotiation where the utility reaches out and they pick who they see as the prominent opponents or stakeholders in the matter, and it might be everybody that was involved and it might be some of who was involved and they hope to sit down around a table and kind of make a deal that they then bring back to the commission. I think the idea is, oh, maybe we get something that’s a little more favorable for everybody that is in that room at least. And we also get the point of having further discussion in front of the commission that might not lead to an outcome that was not as desirable for us as the utility company. Is that what you saw playing out specifically is that you see these settlement negotiations that are a sidecar to the actual typical process that’s supposed to be taking place in public?
Stephen Fischmann:
Absolutely. That whole process of cutting those deals is basically driven by, well, I’ll call it lawfare, right? That’s a popular word out there now, is that people realize what the expense and the investment of the time and the legal process will be. So instead of following through to get a best public interest resolution, you end up compromising to avoid all of the future legal entanglements and due process delays that come up. So there are agreements of convenience that are driven by lawfare and the legal process rather than driven by public interest, if that makes any sense.
John Farrell:
Yes, it totally makes sense. I mean I think everybody involved would like to spend less time involved in those procedures. I have seen for myself that kind of trade-off you mentioned before of well that negotiation might involve like you said, environmental groups, folks looking for solutions to climate change and they’re saying, okay, well, our trade-off will be we get you to close some coal plants, we get you to build more wind and solar, but we also cut a deal. That means you get to build these other things that may or may not be entirely justified but will make your shareholders some money and it’s a win-win from the perspective of those stakeholders because the utility makes money and we get clean energy. But as you said, we start to chip away at that foundational truth, which is that clean energy generally can be cheaper for consumers if it’s developed in a way that it could be.
Stephen Fischmann:
Yeah, and in fact, if you talked about reform at commissions, I would say disallow settlements, litigate it, let your hearing examiner or whomever come to their decision and let the commission decide what’s best in the public interest as opposed to this lawfare process that currently predominates.
John Farrell:
Speaking specifically to one element of the grid here, a lot of what is interesting that’s happening on the electricity system is happening on the distribution system, which is to say the local poles and wires that run through the streets and alleys because it’s stuff like electric vehicles or air source heat pumps or induction stoves, all that kind of stuff. How do you see the regulatory system dealing with that point of interface where consumers are making a lot of decisions for themselves about these appliances or about rooftop solar, but that they’re also having some degree deal with the utility company? Is the regulatory system managing that well?
Stephen Fischmann:
I don’t think nearly as well as it should be. There’s certainly been a lot more attention to it over the last few years, but again, I’ll speak to New Mexico and in New Mexico the legislature is passing forward-looking legislation for us to get to 80% renewables by 2040, a hundred percent I guess by 2045, I can’t remember is the exact dates. And they’ve also passed some grid modernization legislation, which again is a good idea, but it’s where the utilities have gone to the legislature and cut their deals. But it’s legislation that kind of sits off on its own. It’s not part of an integrated look at the entire grid system generation and distribution and transmission and how they all fit together. So I have a business background and I bring kind of a management perspective to a lot of these issues. Admittedly, and I’ll tell you on the legal side, I have little to contribute, but on the management side, I think I bring a focus that many others don’t.
And from the management side, my experience has always been how you put the pieces together is where the big gains happen. That’s where you really make progress. And we’ve got a very balkanized way of looking at all the issues. Distribution is distribution grid mod is grid mod, energy efficiency is energy efficiency. Renewable procurement is different in New Mexico law than non-renewable procurement. It’s all balkanized and it leads to high fuel, poor coordination, poor decision making, and a lack of a cohesive vision of how all the parts move together going forward. That’s really what we need. And it’s not hard to do if you scrape away a lot of the legacy stuff that was meant to solve issues that are no longer germane. Now you need to organize it around the issues that we face now, and a lot of times it just means simplification. For example, in our grid mod law in New Mexico, we say the utilities bring grid mod and the PRC (Public Regulation Commission) is somewhat obligated to say yes to them if they’re somehow financially justified, but also to give the utility a little bonus payment, if you will, for deciding to modernize.
And to me, this is just kind of a classic version of the age old monopoly shakedown, you’re the only one there. We’re not going to do it unless you give us more money. And utilities are overpaid already. Quite frankly. They’re a low risk business that gets a speculative high risk return. I lay the blame at regulators’ feet on that, but we keep feeding into that shakedown mentality and we have to stay away from that. It’s infuriating to see how this process turns into sort of a continual shakedown by monopolies and that those in the regulatory community play along with it and in the legislative community, they play along with it. The legislature gives these utilities a monopoly. They have the power to take it away, yet they always act as if they’re the victim because it’s a shakedown. I don’t know how else to put it.
There is one other way to put it. You could say I look at the contributions from the utilities to the politicians, whether it be the governor or legislative leadership or whomever, and the contributions to the PACS are very significant, and I could step back and say, well, did they keep giving the utility this money at the cost of the consumer? Is this me taking a look at what’s really a racketeering enterprise and saying it’s not racketeering so long as it’s a politician doing it. You look at it from different perspectives and I just want to point out how dysfunctional it becomes.
John Farrell:
Absolutely. It is striking. I mean, one of the things, I published a report earlier this year called Upcharge where we looked among the many things we looked at about the problems with this system was the extraordinary amount of money that utilities give to the folks who are basically in charge of determining their profits. So like you said, there is this very coordinated understood relationship of like, we get some money from you, and then, gee, when this decisions come down about what we’re going to require, well gosh, Janet, it seems to work out for you pretty well.
Stephen Fischmann:
Yeah, I used to sit on the conservation committee when I was in the Senate and they handled energy issues and whatever those issues came up, other legislators were sitting there with their cell phones and you could see the utility lobbyists in the audience and they’re messaging these legislators and you could see some of them are just, they’re basically on a string. These utility lobbyists basically give ’em all the information they have and tell ’em what to do and do it.
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John Farrell:
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John Farrell:
I want to go back to something you said before because I think it kind of gets at this issue. You talked about your management background leading you to believe that there is this opportunity in the way the system is structured. If there were more coordination between these different balkanized pieces, who do you think ought to be coming up with that vision of what our grid looks like? I feel like the way the system works now that regulators in particular are very reactive, which is to say they wait until the utility proposes something and then they have public hearings, they bring information, they ask for information. So by default right now, utilities are providing the vision of what the grid should look like in their own image, in their own interest. Who should be doing that?
Stephen Fischmann:
Well, I’d like to think that there’s, I want to call it, more than a regulatory body. I want to call it kind of a public participation body that puts it together. And I think regulators can be both and should be both because I think it keeps them attached to who should be their major client. Now the whole public’s their client, all the businesses are their client. They need to be fair and consider all interests, but who’s the biggest client? Who’s the most important one? And in my view, it’s the rate payers because there’s hundreds of millions of rate payers and, what, there’s 200 electric utilities IOUs across the country, whatever the number is? That’s the primary client you need to be sure that you’ve taken care of. That’s the biggest public impact. So I haven’t given a lot of thought to how to put that together exactly.
I do think there’s a couple things though that make it simpler. One is, in New Mexico, and I think in most jurisdictions, almost all of the regulatory energy and resources are devoted towards generation, very small amount to distribution, but generation doesn’t need to be a monopoly. And of course there’s been restructuring across a good part of the country that’s tried to separate the two. New Mexico is an integrated utility state. I don’t think generation should be regulated. We spend all this time going into detailed records of generation and coming around to a rate case or something. And so many of the figures I don’t really necessarily trust, I don’t know how they get manipulated. And how regulators deal with them tends to fall in the hands of a few experts. And my experience is when you have a small group of experts working on something, they tend to fall into habits like all the rest of us do.
And a lot of times, over time, some odd assumptions start getting built into the system and not very constructive ones. So why are we doing all this regulation? All we really need to know is the price and whether the source is safe and clean, and we don’t need to start delving into all the finances. And it’s a regulatory process that I think kind of becomes wasteful and pointless. Where we really do need the regulation is on transmission and distribution. And in fact, I would argue for power planning that, oftentimes, rather than planning the generation first, which is certainly what the history in New Mexico, you should be planning the transmission and how the distribution is going to work first, and then just making your generation decisions based on that. And then you can come up with a truly coordinated system. But I just think you need some common sense around it and you need to get rid of, and again, I’ll talk about in New Mexico specifically where we have all of these separate laws for each of these separate areas and a separate report to the legislature on each of those laws.
No, manage it like an enterprise! We’ve got this issue of how efficient are we delivering and how clean and how safe are we delivering this electricity? And there should be one report with each of these other areas as a subhead, and each of those subheads should be showing how it leaks to the other pieces of the puzzle, and then we could get some rational decision making. And so I think it just starts, this is something I worked on as a commissioner getting a new integrated resource 20-year long-term plan together. Well, IRPs in New Mexico never included distribution, only touched on transmission, and yet these are 30 to 40% of utility investments and probably a growing share going forward. Well, what business gives you half a disembodied business plan looking at just generation? This is madness. So we basically came up with a new IRP that includes all that stuff or a new rule and a new rule that says that at least in the short term, you actually have to follow your IRP.
So that meeting that we would get these plans and then we would get resource requests that would only vary loosely tied to these plans. So in our new rule in New Mexico, we say for any investments you make over the next three years that are in your IRP, you need to issue our FPS request for proposals that tie precisely to your IRP, meaning that you can’t just give us a plan for public consumption and then have the real plan on your shelf and issue your RFPs against that plan. So it’s just the idea of true transparency. Your IRP is your true business plan and you actually are required to follow through on it.
John Farrell:
I find that so fascinating. I think one of those things that maybe having worked in the system, people might shrug off, but being on the outside looking in this idea that a utility files a plan saying this is what we’re going to do, regulators approve that plan saying, yes, this plan does align with the public interest, and then previous to this rule, you were having utilities basically say, well, that plan was nice. We loved going through the formality of it, but actually what we want to do is something completely different. Please approve that.
Stephen Fischmann:
Yeah, it wasn’t that bad, but akin to that, it was on that scale, if you will. And the excuse was that, well, some new things have happened. Well, I’m sorry, a major resource takes three to five years to bring on board, and now you’re telling me in your three-year plan, you’ve got an emergency. No. And there’s this odd argument that comes up, well, we have to be able to adjust to these emergencies. Well, great, if there is one, let’s define the emergency actually so that it justifies the change and don’t just come to us and say, well, things change. And so this is what we’re presenting. Now, what can I say? It’s just basic kind of managerial discipline.
John Farrell:
You mentioned the reform to the resource planning process to the IRP process as one of the things that you were working on when you were at the commission. Are there other changes or reforms that you were trying to push through or successfully push through when you were at the commission that you feel like helped with this problem of aligning all of the different pieces and of prioritizing rate payers?
Stephen Fischmann:
Yeah, it’s the 440 rule, but I think it’s common practice across the country that for distribution investments, utilities don’t go through a formal authorization process for a distribution investment for new reconductoring or a new power line or whatever. They will submit what in New Mexico we call a 440, which basically says, we’re going to do this. Here’s a few details about it, and if you have any problems, let us know. But otherwise, if the commission gives them no response, they just go ahead and do the project. So bottom line is, from my perspective, distribution regulation in New Mexico and in similar jurisdictions basically goes unregulated. And as I said, distribution can be 25% distribution alone of the investment. And with grid modernization going forward, it stands to get bigger. You’re basically just saying, Hey, do what you want.
We don’t have any control of whether we need these resources. And of course your audience probably is totally familiar with the idea that the more they spend and the less efficient they are, the more money they make. So there’s this perverse incentive. So we really needed to get a handle on that. And the excuse of utilities has always been, or at least what I always hear New Mexico is that, well, these are just a bunch of small projects and we can’t do a CCN proceeding for every $3 million project. And in my management experience, that’s not the way to look at it at all is that you’re doing a whole bunch of small projects, but they’re all related to a management strategy. So I might be doing a grid mod kind of deal where maybe I’m doing a dynamic line balancing to get more efficient flow of current or I want to move to advanced conductors, or we’ve got a lot of smaller projects that fall under a much bigger umbrella.
And what we need to do is define what those umbrellas are, why we’re moving that direction, what the strategy is, why we decided to use that technology and how. This is something I really pushed and we managed to get adopted was a new 440 rule that asked for a number of things. One is give us a budget beginning of each year of how much you’re planning to spend on distribution projects. Break it into some pieces. How much is modernization or upgrade, how much is expansion, how much is maintenance? What are the key strategies driving each of those? Give us capacities that your key substations and when you submit a proposal, submit what the demand is on the facility you’re planning to upgrade or build and what the usage is to justify the investment. Let’s just start putting a little bit of some kind of structure around this huge investment that’s being made in distribution and that regulators are kind of throwing their hands up about in the past they bought this idea that each of these projects is a separate little thing and on maintenance they’d say, well, how can we know what’s going to break and how much it’s going to cost?
Well do whatever other business in the frigging world does. You’ve got a history of years of how much your total cost is per year. You have a sense of what’s been modernized recently and what hasn’t. What’s a potential cost for God’s sakes? Put together an estimate. You’re not going to hit your budget, but we’re going to know, we’re going to know generally where it’s going to be and why. So all of that stuff just needs to become transparent, and I believe that by the way, there is a place for government ownership of those distribution systems. There’s a lot of good financial reasons for that.
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John Farrell:
We are going to take a short break when we come back. I ask whether there are particular metrics that could help regulators and advocates measure good distribution performance. I ask about the role of public ownership and the reasonable bounds of monopoly grid control. You are listening to a local Energy Rules podcast with Stephenn Fishman, former state senator and former chair of the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission. Hey, thanks for listening to Local Energy Rules. We’re so glad you’re here. If you like what you’ve heard, please help other folks Find us by giving the show a rating and review on Apple Podcasts or Spotify, five stars. If you think we’ve earned it. As a bonus, I’ll gladly read your review aloud on the show if it includes an energy related joke or pun. Now back to the program.
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John Farrell:
I want to just dig into the distribution stuff for a second. And first of all, just again, like you said about the maintenance, I just find that really funny, right? They have all these poles and wires. They even have often a particular lifetime when they build the asset like, oh, this thing is supposed to last for 50 years or 40 years or whatever, and you just think about cumulatively on a spreadsheet somewhere. It shouldn’t be that hard to say 50 of these things will be at their lifetime this year and probably need replacement. The other thing though I’m just curious about is when you’re talking about having them budget for the distribution changes and putting them in these different buckets like modernization, upgrades, maintenance, I love that, getting some more specificity. Did you ever find that there were particular measures, particular data you could request as a, it sounded like you had that when it came to how does this impact the capacity on a given substation, right, that you’re going to do this thing, but I’m just curious.
We talk about sometimes hosting capacity. How much room is there on a distribution feeder to add more solar, for example? Or we talk about with the grid writ large, this term load factor, which is like what percentage of the capacity of the grid is being used at any given time with a higher load factor sort of indicating a more efficient use of your system because it means more of your facilities are running all the time, or that conversely that you’re not building facilities that are only running two hours a year and that are just basically sitting around. Were there any metrics like that that you found were really helpful in this scrutiny of how utilities managed the distribution system that you think other folks should be thinking about?
Stephen Fischmann:
No magic formulas and in a lot of the rulemakings we did, we are requiring a lot more information around hosting capacity. There aren’t any magic metrics. The main thing is, or at least I know, and maybe I’m wrong on this, maybe the utility industry truly is different than every other business in the world, but you need certain information to run your business. And a frustration that I found as a regulator is that there are always these claims about how much work it would be for the utility to give us this information or to develop this information that we would request. My response to it is, well, gee, if you don’t have this information on hand already, how the hell do you manage your business and should we be allowing you to hold this franchise if you’re that incompetent at running the business that you don’t have this information and regulators tiptoe around this, they go through these legal requests and listen, and I’m just sitting there.
It’s just this practical management perspective saying, God, how can we possibly be arguing about this? Either you have it because you’re competent and you know what you’re doing or you don’t have it, in which case we should be booting you out. It’s just a matter of transparency. And I do think the process has become so hidebound by legal standards that are appropriate for determining whether someone has created a criminal offense where someone’s life is at stake and all this very cumbersome interpretation of due process makes sense because the consequences are so great for that individual. In this case, we’re talking something different and it seems to me we need kind of a clear delineation of what due process standards are and how much legal delay and lawfare could be allowed to interfere with a regulatory process in the public interest. So I really do think there needs to be some rethinking of that and that a lot of these very exacting standards from criminal law don’t belong quite as much in the regulatory sphere.
John Farrell:
The thing that comes to mind is that people sometimes describe utility regulation as a quasi-judicial process, and now I’m thinking maybe we need to say that it needs to be sort of like quasi due process, but not quite the same.
Stephen Fischmann:
There you go. I mean, it just gets ridiculous that every little step along the way, you can delay it with some new due process request and it gets crazy.
John Farrell:
So then my next question just gets back to something you mentioned about public ownership because there are a lot of people who talk about public ownership sometimes as sort of a panacea to all the ills of the grid, and that includes things like a public takeover of everything. Some folks are very interested in public generation of electricity. I think some folks like the New York Power Authority is being looked at as a public backstop around clean energy generation. We have lots of communities that at a municipal level have looked at public takeover of the entire system, which would be vertically integrated. So I guess I want to ask this question in two ways. One is where do you think public ownership would make a difference, but also what is the real scope of a monopoly here? Because the premise over a hundred years ago was the whole thing is a monopoly, power generation, transmission distribution, retail sales, everything’s a monopoly. 30 years ago we had kind of a reckoning with that and there were some restructuring in states that said, you know what? Generation’s not a monopoly and retail sales doesn’t have to be a monopoly. Where would you draw the lines in terms of ideally who is controlling what parts of the system, where should there be competition and where does public ownership really make sense?
Stephen Fischmann:
So I think generation is not part of the monopoly. I think we would likely be much better served if we have transmission and distribution monopolies where you really don’t want 10 sets of power lines all serving the same customer base from 10 different companies. Just to use the simple classic example, but I don’t think we need that in generation. We can do contracts with folks. I think that competition can do a much better job of making sure that we’ve got good prices, obviously in terms of energy policy, legislatures pass renewable energy requirements or regulators have them and the market will build where the demand is based on those policies. So I think we should just have a nice competitive power generation environment. Also, it allows for a lot less gameplay, whereas the more complicated the law gets, the more the utilities win. So the businesses, utilities always complain about complexity of regulation, but they’re the primary beneficiaries.
They’re the only ones who have the resources to actually manipulate and gameplay with all of the complications that come with that complexity. So they’re always inevitably the winner when you get it more complicated. So anyway, I would like to see that go into distribution entities basically contract with power generators to get the power, and then we regulate at that distribution level, and there might be some regulation around the nature of the kinds of contracts that those entities can engage in with generators. So I think that can get out of it easily. I am not a big fan of the retail market and the retail providers because all the evidence that I see, and I don’t know what you’ve run into in your experience, but is that customers have very little in markets where there are multiple providers at the final sale to the consumer of what their choices are and what the pros and cons really are.
And most consumers don’t have the time to sort all that out and you get a zillion different plans. And to me it’s chaos and it’s rife for abuse. And I think that in states that have adopted deregulation of the sales, if you will, or that they’ve experienced a lot of not very principled behavior by the providers. So I think it’s a favorite of consumers. I think it prevents a lot of game playing and fraud. I do think a lot of the issues that rate payers face can be handled by distribution and billing entity, if you will, or sales entity that’s one and the single source provider to customers if they actually follow the principles that utilities currently profess about cost of service. So there are plans that are advantageous to certain consumers, but we don’t need to turn this into Medicare, right? We can make it fairly simple and have classes of customers that pay a certain rate that’s based on to some degree their true costs. I think it can be overplayed cost of service, but certainly utilities in my experience, always claim cost of service when they give you a rate plan and in practice, whether it is time of day pricing or whatever it is, they don’t really care about cost of service at all. They just care about what’s convenient and they’re very hypocritical about it.
John Farrell:
Do you think there is any state that is doing a really good job in terms of sort of managing the risk of Investor-owned utilities? Were there other places, I guess even in the United States or internationally that you looked at as a regulator and said, Hey, this is a good example. This is something I can draw from. Is anyone doing this well?
Stephen Fischmann:
Well, I always see somebody did really good at this, so they’re maybe really good at doing renewable energy, but I don’t know how good they’re doing on taking care of customers. So I’m really reluctant to say anybody is doing better or worse than anybody. I think it’s kind of a mixed picture and a mixed bag in each state. They’re doing well on some things and not well on others. So I hesitate to say that I guess what I would say though is that one, we can get rid of a lot of expense if we move away from our current regulatory model into a new one and that we get out of the private ownership model, certainly on transmission and distribution as much as possible. It’s costly for consumers because you have the extra cost of taxes, financing costs go much higher when it’s a private entity.
And then of course regulators have been granting these outside levels of return to utilities. And I don’t even want to get into all the obfuscation that goes on, that one just drives me crazy why a utility gets a 10% return for very little risk, and any other business out there on the market can expect 6 or 7% return and they’ve got competition and risk and all kinds of stuff going on. It just floors me. It also floors me by the way, that 60 to 70 or 50 to 70% of the profits that a utility makes go straight out to dividends rather than being reinvested directly in expanding a system that greatly needs updating and expanding. To me, that’s just crazy inefficiency from enterprise management standpoint. So to me, the challenge is how do you get those things more under a governmental type oversight but restore some of the entrepreneurial instincts that help make a successful enterprise? The willingness to experiment and between regulators and utilities, the environment’s become so risk averse that we miss out on a lot of opportunities because you need to take some controlled risk and you need to have some failures in order to learn, and we don’t have an environment that encourages that.
John Farrell:
One of the ideas that I’ve been interested in is the distribution system operator model. So I think this kind of goes the direction you’re talking about with public ownership of the wires. One of the things that I’ve talked a lot about that’s interesting to me about it is the removal of the conflict of interest between the utilities, typical way of making money through these guaranteed rates of return and by spending on infrastructure and the fact that a lot of what we can do for distribution and transmission, and you kind of referenced this before, things like reconductoring lines, things like dynamic line ratings for transmission lines to get more out of them without having to rebuild entirely new transmission infrastructure. At the distribution level, we have people installing solar and batteries and there’s some really interesting opportunities to think about how could we control those technologies in ways that would make the grid more robust. Do you see opportunities there? If that entity is publicly owned, that runs the distribution system where it’s not just, there’s no longer that profit incentive to just build stuff, but there’s also a chance to, I don’t know, tap into the interesting things that are happening that consumers want to invest in and figure out how to harness them to make the grid better too.
Stephen Fischmann:
I think there’s room there to use incentives for private contractors that serve that entity that are willing to work on projects that innovate and don’t leave us stuck in the mud with all technologies. And I think you need to put the two together though, because actually I’ve seen government entities or government owned utilities make some huge and inexcusable mistakes. Every system is subject to corruption, including government, and to me, whatever you set up, we all need oversight. We all screw up, you screw up, I screw up, everyone screws up. We need someone looking over our shoulders to point it out to us. Well, we are screwing up. I think when we set up these entities, we need to have several forces at play to make sure there’s always oversight, and I want to call it just oversight, but there’s also always a creative impulse there that moves us forward.
John Farrell:
I’m aware that we’re wrapping up here, so I guess I want to jump to a question I was thinking of, which is what’s one or two things that you wish every state commission would do today? Maybe it’s not very big, but would just sort of start turning the ship in the right direction?
Stephen Fischmann:
Well, I’d say two big things for me. One is start regulating distribution, stop treating it as an afterthought, treat it as a driver of where we’re headed, and that’s going to be for distributed energy purposes, for actual costs, and even for making wiser decisions regarding generation, and those could be locational decisions or whatever. The second would be do not allow settlements, adjudicate all cases, adjudicate ’em according to the law, and I think that puts pressure on the legislature to make smarter laws, but I think it gets rid of some of the deal-making where very well-meaning people have come into the commission wanting to cut deals and sometimes successfully getting deals that have some very destructive consequences.
John Farrell:
Same question, but for legislatures, you’ve also been a legislator. Is there anything you think the state legislature should immediately be moving to do?
Stephen Fischmann:
Legislate policy. Don’t legislate details. Utilities and interest groups come in with all these details and I have to tell you, and they get included in legislation and they just turn into a complete legal minefield in New Mexico. I find at the regulatory level, we’re just tripping all over these legal obstacles that have been created by unnecessary detail in legislation. That’s number one. Number two, don’t legislate to solve this year’s problems legislate to create a strong cohesive policy environment, which usually means stick to policy goals. Don’t get tracked into details of what’s going on today because that’s going to create problems down the road and be clear to state your legislative intent. In New Mexico, there’s a tendency not to state the legislative intent on a bill. For some reason they don’t like that because that might actually force them to put a law in place that does what they’ve advertised it to do, but put a clear legislative intent on every frigging bill so that it doesn’t get twisted into something that does exactly the opposite of what the so-called intent was when it was being debated.
John Farrell:
Is there anything I failed to ask you about, Stephen, that you were dying to say from your experience as a legislator and a regulator?
Stephen Fischmann:
There’s a lot more I could say. I found it a very emotional experience being a commissioner in the regulatory space and just seeing how good intentions get sabotaged so easily, and I think there are a lot of things we can do to remedy that, but that’s for another time.
John Farrell:
Sounds good. Well, Stephen, thank you again for joining me to talk about your experience and kind of your insights about how we could be doing this system much more effectively. It is really lovely to hear from someone who’s been on the inside and who understands what we’re doing poorly and what we could do better.
Stephen Fischmann:
Will thanks for having me, and thanks for your thoughtful questions then. Thanks for all you do.
***
John Farrell:
Thank you so much for listening to this episode of Local Energy Rules with Stephen Fischmann, former state senator and former chair of the New Mexico Public Regulation Commission on the show page. Look for a link to New Mexico’s Rule 440, to our interview with New Mexico Advocate Mariel Nazi who shares many of the same critiques of the Monopoly utility system, and to ILSR’s report on utility monopoly power, Upcharge, which covers many of the issues discussed in this interview.
Local Energy Rules is produced by myself and Ingrid Behrsin with editing provided by audio engineer Drew Birschbach.
I want to take a brief moment to thank Maria McCoy, our Intrepid senior researcher, who you may have noticed is no longer listed at the end of the local Energy Rules podcast credits. Maria recently left the Institute for Local Self-Reliance for graduate school after five terrific years, and I can’t thank her enough for all she did while working here. She produced 150 local Energy Rules episodes, got them published, wrote summaries for the website, and on occasion had to do some gnarly troubleshooting. She hand drew the podcast logo that now shows up in your feeds, which previously looked like the bad marriage of some terrible clip art and a 1995 computer geometry program, and Maria was the person responsible for most of which you see in the energy section of I SR’S website, including our national Community Solar Tracker, the Community Power Scorecard of State Energy Democracy policies, and a much, much more. Maria, we wish you the very best. We hope to keep this podcast and our work up to your standards and we expect great things from you in the years to come. Thank you again.
Tune back into local energy rules every two weeks to hear how we can take on concentrated power to transform the energy system. Until next time, keep your energy local and thanks for listening.
Backroom Deals Undercut Everyday Consumers’ Priorities
In New Mexico, as in many other states, utility regulation is supposed to make sure the voices of ratepayers are heard. However, as Fischmann points out, the reality is far different. “The general public is not well-represented,” he explains. “Interest groups with specific agendas often dominate the conversation, leaving the average consumer on the sidelines.”
Utilities and select interest groups often negotiate side deals to avoid protracted litigation and public scrutiny. The more complex the negotiations, the more the utilities stand to benefit. This “deal-cutting” process not only sidesteps ratepayers, but also drives up the cost of clean energy, ultimately slowing progress toward a greener, more affordable grid. “If clean energy becomes expensive, the public will lose faith in its potential,” Fischmann says.
“We need to eliminate settlements; let’s pursue litigation and let the commission decide what’s in the public interest.”
To address these backroom deals, Fischmann advocates for a fundamental shift in how utility cases are handled. By moving away from informal settlements, he believes states can push for decisions that prioritize the needs of consumers, rather than the financial interests of utilities.
Standing Up to the Utility Shakedown
Regulators and legislators also need to stop routinely agreeing to overpay utilities for the services they’re already obligated to provide. In a dynamic Fischmann refers to as a “continual shakedown,” the utilities refuse to act unless they’re generously compensated. They get away with it, in part, because they’re monopolies.
“The legislature gives these utilities a monopoly. They have the power to take it away, yet [legislators] always act as if they’re the victim because it’s a shakedown.”
Utilities contribute heavily to political action committees that finance legislator campaigns, with the outcome being that politicians act in the utilities’ interest rather than that of their own constituents. For Fischmann, the failure of legislators to wield their power to rein in utilities and the rollover of regulators to utility demands amounts to a form of racketeering, where utilities commonly get away with earning ten percent returns. In contrast, any other enterprise generally expects a six percent return while also carrying much higher financial risks.
The Need for a Unified Vision
While New Mexico has made progress with renewable energy mandates and grid modernization legislation, approaches to generation, transmission, and distribution planning remain fragmented and uncoordinated. Currently, grid investments in New Mexico are divided into separate laws and reports and different jurisdictions, leading to inefficiencies and missed opportunities for coordination.
“It’s all balkanized and it leads to high [prices], poor coordination, poor decision making, and a lack of a cohesive vision of how all the parts move together going forward.”
Fischmann’s experience chairing the regulatory commission revealed the importance of treating the grid as an interconnected system, rather than as a series of isolated components.“There’s a lack of integration, and that’s where the real gains lie. If we can streamline the process and simplify outdated systems, we can make real progress.” By connecting these projects under one umbrella, regulators could approach the process like it’s an enterprise, with a focus on efficiency, safety, and sustainability.
Shift the Focus to Distribution
Historically, the regulatory focus has been on generation. But distribution – the poles and wires that deliver power and that account for half of utility investments – has been left largely unregulated.
“IRPs in New Mexico never included distribution, only touched on transmission, and yet these are 30 to 40% of utility investments and probably a growing share going forward. Well, what business gives you half a disembodied business plan looking at just generation? This is madness.”
This narrow focus leaves many consumer goods – electric vehicles, induction stoves, etc. – disconnected from the grid’s overall strategy. And distribution, in Fischmann’s opinion, is one place where a monopoly model actually makes sense – “you don’t need ten sets of power lines from ten different companies serving the same customer base.”
As a commissioner, Fischmann pushed for reforming New Mexico’s 440 rule, which now mandates that utilities submit annual budgets for their proposed distribution projects, forcing utilities to present their distribution projects holistically rather than piecemeal. This is a step toward creating greater transparency and accountability in the distribution system.
A Path Forward: Prioritize Ratepayers
Fischmann advocates for a regulatory system that keeps ratepayers at the forefront. Regulators need to to stop acting as mere rubber stamps for utility plans and instead adopt a forward-thinking, cohesive vision that benefits the public and prioritizes transparency. “The ratepayers should be the primary client for commissions,” he insists.
“Legislate policy. Don’t legislate details.”
Fischmann suggests there are three ways policymakers can start doing this: 1) by insisting that all rate cases are adjudicated according to the law rather than through side deals, 2) by designing legislation that is explicit in its intent, and 3) by ensuring that legislation is not burdened by too much technical detail, which can make oversight all but impossible. The success of clean, renewable energy and affordable electricity for all depends on leaders taking these steps.
Episode Notes
See these resources for more behind the story:
- Dig into New Mexico’s Rule 440, which stipulates utilities’ reporting and filing requirements.
- Listen to Local Energy Rules episode 209 with New Mexico consumer advocate Mariel Nanasi.
- Read ILSR’s recent report, Upcharge, which explains the hidden costs of electric utility monopoly power.
For concrete examples of how towns and cities can take action toward gaining more control over their clean energy future, explore ILSR’s Community Power Toolkit.
Explore local and state policies and programs that help advance clean energy goals across the country using ILSR’s interactive Community Power Map.
This is the 224th episode of Local Energy Rules, an ILSR podcast with Energy Democracy Director John Farrell, which shares stories of communities taking on concentrated power to transform the energy system.
Local Energy Rules is produced by ILSR’s John Farrell and Ingrid Behrsin. Audio engineering by Drew Birschbach.
For timely updates from the Energy Democracy Initiative, follow John Farrell on Twitter or Bluesky, and subscribe to the Energy Democracy weekly update.