Regulators as Referees When Utilities and Customers Clash — Episode 173 of Local Energy Rules

If you have cooperatives that that are self-regulating, they have to stay in their lane and the only thing they can do is distribution of electricity. So our cooperatives formed a for-profit company way back to build transformers and then have morphed that company into one of our solar providers. Which is interesting because some of the cooperatives are very against our solar policy. Some of the cooperatives embrace it, but they all profit from it because they have this company that’s owned by the nonprofit cooperatives. So the profits that it makes flow back and reduce those folks rates. But if we did not regulate cooperatives, you’d never let an unregulated business get outside of its core area into another business cuz it would create all kinds of problems. So they’ve also been very aggressive and broadband, which is a very big issue in the rural areas, access to broadband. But you have to have the rules if you’re mixing for-profit with regulatory nonprofit, you have to have a separation so the money doesn’t slip over the wall and when something bad happens, you have people without electric service. So our regulatory model has allowed them in some ways to innovate even though some of the cooperatives are pretty fiercely opposed to the innovation, even though I’m sure they cash the checks when they get their share of profits.

And then what they did was they found the thing called RUs, which is a federal agency that finances cooperatives. It was part of FDR’S program for rural electrification in the thirties and forties, we’re gonna subsidize the financing so it’s cheaper so you can spread electricity to low population density areas where the economics aren’t the same. And so they tried to say that the loan covenant from their federally backed loan required insurance then required a fee and all of these different things. And then they said the regulation that they cited didn’t say how much insurance. So they just took it upon themselves to decide how much insurance. And of course they decided that residential houses need commercial insurance policies that cost more than the annual electric bill of the customer. Then they just quit interconnecting. So we have like probably two or 300 solar facilities that are sitting out in the sun absorbing solar energy that’s not being used while they remain plugged into the grid paying for electricity that’s generated by natural gas, which right now is very expensive, while their solar panels sit on their roof capturing energy that they can’t use and that’s just 10 outta 10 stupid. That’s what that is.

They say that there’s a federal regulation, but what they don’t understand is there’s also a federal law called the Federal Power Act that divides power between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission or FERC and the states. FERC who have power over electric energy wholesale and retail is state not because the states say, that’s what the law is. That’s a federal law that expressly reserves that power to the states. The Federal Power Act doesn’t say the Department of Agriculture which administers the cooperative loan stuff gets to set retail rates. It says the state does. Now that doesn’t mean that the state can ignore federal law when the EPA says you gotta put scrubbers on a plant, you have to put scrubbers on a plant and those costs blow through a retail rate case.

Well first of all, they didn’t say what the insurance amount was. They never came to their regulator and said, the feds require us to have insurance. Here’s our proposal. They just took that authority on themselves. And then when people didn’t want to pay more for insurance than their electric bill, they refused to interconnect them. And it’s just a regulated monopoly that wants to be an unregulated monopoly. And I’d before that, if they wanted to take their little service territory and say, okay, we can do whatever we want, well I’d agree with that. If anyone else could then go in there and sell electricity. Because the law prohibits people from selling electricity other than them. They have to follow the rules that their regulator was for and it’s this, this resistance over time. They use legal process to delay and delay and delay. And that was the frustration that led to my departure that if all were gonna do is slog through everything as slow as we can so we can’t get to the other stuff we wanted to do, demand response, all these other things and I wasn’t gonna accomplish what I wanted to accomplish.

And that’s still grinding forward. And what what’s really dumb about it in my opinion, is our policy enables rooftop solar at the small scale, but it’s really directed at larger scale because scale, what that is is if it’s bigger, does it cost less per unit? And in a state like ours with low population density, it makes a lot of sense to build it big in a field. And because land values are cheap, I mean if you’re in in Manhattan, you can’t do that. You have to use your roofs in Manhattan because you don’t have hundreds of hundreds of acres that you can put solar on. But in Arkansas where you do, and it’s really driven our economic development, we have US Steel building a 3.5 billion plant driven by their access to scaled solar. And because we have cheap flat land with higher radiance, solar is a good deal here, we wanted to scale it up and drive economic development. So instead of these people thinking about how they can use solar to drive their economic development, they’re trying to figure out how they can zip a retired Vietnam veteran out of the money he spent to put solar panels on his house. By not interconnecting them. There’s no logical review of what they do. They get mad and instead of having their lawyers tell them what the law is, they tell the lawyers what the law is and you just go over the cliff of the that that’s what’s going on.

That’s the problem that you have. And the fixed cost, I mean distribution is fixed cost. You put it in there and you pay it over time. So if you can reduce your share of fixed cost, those costs go to other customers. And there’s truth in that. But that doesn’t end the debate because there’s also benefits that you need to measure. So you need to take that cost shift and measure it accurately and then you need to take the benefits and measure it accurately. And to me, how you resolve the situation is you should take the cost shift and divide it out among all the customers and then tell us what it is on a bill impact per month. And the problem with the utilities cost shift argument is even though it’s well grounded in economics in terms of fixed cost, when you divide it in bill impact for other customers, it’s de minimus. Okay, if it’s $10 a month, I care. If it’s 2 cents a month, I’m gonna watch it. I’m gonna let the technology develop, I’m gonna let customers have an option and I’m gonna measure it. So that this is what we told the legislature when they passed this was a cost shift. I said, well I know there’s a cost shift, but we know there’s so little solar right now that it’s minimus, but we need to do was watch it, let people experiment. That’s what the problem is when you cut off innovation, it it’s like in football there’s what they call a coaching tree and it’s, well this coach had these assistants that became head coaches and it just grows.

If you have three people have A and B that want to do a transaction that has a negative impact on C, what the utilities are saying is that has a negative impact on C, let’s ban the transaction. Well that’s stupid. Let’s measure the cost impact on A and B and give C the opportunity. What if they pay? What if A and B pay C, you do the transaction that way you keep the economy rolling. What they’re trying to do is take the cost shift to kill the transaction instead of measuring the results. And when they become unreasonable mitigating them.

And that’s what we’re trying to do is okay, so we say okay, we’re gonna watch and measure and then we say, okay, we’re gonna have a grid fee. If you guys say there’s a cost shift, if you in the utility world say there’s a cost shift, file it, bring the commission your data and we’ll impose a grid fee on solar customers to mitigate, we’ll let them do what they want. But some of the economic benefits we’re gonna spread to the non participants if the cost shift is unreasonable. And we did that in June of 2020, there has yet to be a grid fee filing, they won’t put their data on the table. And I suspect that it’s because even though they can demonstrate there’s a cost shift, it’s so small in per customer effort. If you went to a legislative committee and you’re pounding the table about cost shift and then you have to go in there and they say, well how much cost shift 4 cents a month, the legislature’s gonna say, why the hell are we wasting our time on 4 cents a month out of $115 utility bill? They never filed it. They still haven’t. Nobody’s filed for a grid fee.

And then finally we have a session coming up, we at the commission said, okay, just give us your data if you don’t wanna file for a grid fee, we just wanna see where we’re at. We know there’s some cost shift that’s getting bigger as solar ramps up and we wanna measure it and if it becomes unreasonable, we wanna mitigate it. They filed a motion to dismiss and say, you don’t have authority to ask for cost shift data, even though they’ve been over legislature saying cost shift, cost shift, cost shift. And I, I clobbered among that at the legislature. So we set up a grid fee, file your data and then they’d say, we, we filed our data, we’ll give them any data they want. And then we ask for the data and then they move to dismiss. And, and that’s, I mean there’s a gray area where reasonable people can differ. Everybody’s not gonna look at at at everything exactly the same and that’s fine. But when that’s what you’re doing, you’re not in the gray area. It’s just stupid. And in the meantime we got a 3.5 billion US steel investment because of our solar policy. And these people are fiddling around with some retired Vietnam veteran solar panels on his house, which has a de minimus impact on a small co-op and a microscopic impact on the state as a whole. That’s what they want to fight about. Instead of looking at the opportunity and saying How can we get the next U.S. Steel deal because we have a solar cost advantage there.

Some the cheapest solar in MISO, which is the, the regional market that goes all the way from Manitoba Canadian province to the city of New Orleans in the middle of the country and we’ve got the cheapest solar resource in that area. We got Amazon and General Motors built solar facilities here to offset their load in Detroit and St. Louis. And of course Amazon is scattered all around. We have a cheap solar resource because we’re south, flat, and we’ve got the delta, particularly in the south, is some of the worst poverty in our whole country. And it depresses land values. Well those depressed land values because it’s flat and higher radiance, it drives investment to the place we need it the most and the delta. So we have a policy that’s working and then we have these people that, you know, they don’t debate the policy, they don’t debate the economic development. They’re trying to wallow around in the administrative rules, delaying, delaying, delaying. We can’t act unless we have a hearing. We have to do all of this stuff. So they do something stupid knowing it’s gonna take us 15 months to go through all the process stuff and what they’re trying to do, which is rage inducing. They don’t care about that Vietnam veteran solar on his house. They’re trying to punish that person so his neighbor doesn’t want to put solar on his house. That’s what’s going on and that’s what’s really irritating.

But that’s also another reason not to make a real long commitment. Part of the purposes of our solar deal is we have all these prices that are going crazy, we have environmental regulation, we have changing policy and I’m supposed to figure out how it’s gonna be 40 years from now, make a 40 year commitment. I don’t want to do that If I’ve got a business that wants to make a 20 year commitment to take that risk on themselves, a 20 year commitment on solar, you’re giving them the freedom to manage their own risk and you’re taking it off the administrative procedure and the regulator, you’re spreading out your risk and you’re allowing people to manage for themselves the problem that you have. If you do solar today for 20 years and this fusion thing works and it’s cheap five, 10 years from now, you might wish you hadn’t done it but we gave you the option, you got to make that decision for yourself.

And of course when people started making these decisions, natural gas was $2, well now it’s $8. Everybody that made the decision to do the solar is saving a ton of money on natural gas prices. And in the legislative committee that was given by me as the number one reason why we were doing this, to give customers options to hedge natural gas prices. And I know a lot about this stuff and the utility people know a lot about this stuff. But if you take me and the president of the biggest utility and put us in the room and say you figure it out and we let thousands and thousands and thousands of people try to figure it out for themselves in their own life, I know it’s gonna have the better result. It’s gonna be the market.

That’s all the market is is individuals trying to figure it out themselves. Sometimes they’re wrong, sometimes they’re right but on average that system works. You take all the dump transactions and all the smart and you put ’em in one pound and average ’em, it works pretty good. So we wanted to bring that into the utility space. It’s harder to innovate because of the long life but you still want to do that. No, by the way, I don’t wanna afford your commitment on a gas plant. There gotta be a better way cuz if I commit my rate payers now they’re gonna be writing checks for that gas plant 40 years from now. I don’t want to take that risk, that risk exists but I want businesses or groups of individuals through community solar to be able to figure out what they wanna do with that risk. So far it’s worked out pretty good because gas prices took off.

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The weakness of solar and wind is that they’re variable scaled up. And every technology starts expensive. The first home that was electrified was JP Morgan’s house. That’s cuz he was the only one that could afford it. But if you’d have killed it then because that’s a toy for the rich and it’s not fair, look what you have. But every technology – electric vehicles start out that way. Every technology starts out as really expensive. So it’s a toy for the rich but when it scales up the cost come down and wind has scaled up where the cost come down, solar has scaled up where the costs come down, storage is starting to scale up. That hasn’t happened with that but that might be next. So we have wind and solar that are now inexpensive even though they started out as expensive like everything does when you scale up manufacturing, the price comes down.

Now if you limited their penetration they would always be cheap. They get expensive not because their per unit cost. They get expensive when you have massive deployment and then the cost is dealing with scaled intermittency, that’s where the cost comes from. So you have a runway where it’s cheap and you should just build it as fast as you can and we’re still in that runway in my opinion. But you have to be looking down the road, what are we gonna do when we get so much of it because it’s cheap that the intermittent risk and then when the intermittent risk gets tied to extreme weather, that’s when you get really negative outcomes. And we can project, we can predict the wind within 2% like 90, 95% of the time, which is an awesome use of big data. You just big data record the wind output and big data record the weather patterns and then you use that to project. But it’s that 5% outlier like winter storm Uri that it’s a winter risk.

The limitation with solar is when the sun goes down and load stays up, you need about four hours in today’s battery technology can cover you in the summer. In the winter you still have a huge risk because you might get four days without sun and you have no solar for four days, you got four hours of storage and extreme cold like extreme heat is also life-threatening. So to me the best way to deal with intermittent resources at scale is to have intermittent load at scale and give people flexibility. Who can do that and who wanna do that, who get paid for due load to be able to have their load respond to the generation. But if you’re gonna scale intermittent, you need to have intermittent load as the best way to respond to it.

And to me the third parties, that’s why the third parties are important that they experiment with their own money. The utilities are a pass through entity: when they experiment, they’re experimenting with rate payer money. So if you have somebody that’s willing to experiment with their own money, let’s let ’em do that. Let’s let ’em do that. Even if there’s some cost shift because you’re gonna get some benefits. Let’s measure the cost shift like we talked about before, but that’s early adopter risk. You don’t want to prohibit early adopter risk or you get no early adopters and you’re get no early adopters, you get no innovation. So if you have third parties willing to do that and there’s a thing called aggregation that’s really important and that’s grouping people together.

Now I’m an energy nerd. I would sit around and play around and try to manipulate my load to save $5, not for the $5 i’d I’d keep the $5 but to experiment. Well most people don’t do that. What you need is an automated deal that uses technology and then you group a bunch of people together or you get averaging. Some people won’t turn down their thermostats, some people will. Well if you try to do a program where each individual has to do it by themselves, you bump into the edges all the time. What you need is an averaging. And aggregation allows you to average like like a retailer, like a Kroger grocery store. If they got 20 stores, instead of trying to figure out how much load they can move at each store and get penalized, if they don’t move it they can take their 20 store and average it and then have a a standard they have to meet for all 20 stores. Or if this one’s a little short and that one’s a little long, they still hit the target cuz they average.

So it’s not just residential, it’s businesses that are co owned. Well I’ll use Target cuz they’re a Minnesota company. Let Target combine all its targets. But if you’re Joe’s hardware store, let Joe and Jill and Tom and Mary that have one hardware store, combine all theirs the way that Target does and get the same advantage of averaging then the store at the, at the residential level too. That way you can see, I mean we have these Google thermostats out there. I mean some people will pay to give somebody the right to change their temperature two degrees if they have to. Some people won’t. Well let’s figure out who those people are by having an entrepreneur test demand because that’s what they do best. If before the iPhone somebody who come did a poll and said do you want to take your telephone and combine it with a camera? Who would’ve said yes to that? Well nobody, the entrepreneurs figure out demand that you don’t even realize is there. Let’s give them the opportunity to do that and drive innovation.

But what they’re good at is they’re engineering this system. They designed a system that takes power and puts it in almost every house in this country, which is really, really hard to do and they’re really, really good at that. But that’s an iterative engineering process and that’s figuring out how to do it best and keep doing it that way and improving it a little bit at a time, which is an iterative engineering process that doesn’t work as well when you need innovation and when prices go crazy, policy’s changing and the technology’s changing, it doesn’t work very well. But it’s a regulatory process. It’s not just the utilities, it’s also the regulators. The cell phone technology existed in the sixties and seventies. Well why wasn’t it deployed. Well regulators didn’t want the regulated telephone monopoly to engage in speculative investment and add it to their phone bills.

The regulators don’t want the utility to engage in speculative investment. The utility really doesn’t want to do that either because if Xcel energy invented the perpetual motion machine that produced unlimited energy at no cost with rate payer money, well the rate payers would benefit from that, right? The value of that innovation would stick with the rate payers. You innovate differently when somebody else is gonna benefit from it from you and you. That’s just human nature, right? That’s why markets work. So what you need to do is keep those things in mind and how do you get innovation? Well to me you get the third parties competing with the utility at the utility, couldn’t get 400 million to demand response and you’ve got a third party standard where that says, oh I think I can do it, let’s give them a try, let’s let them try to do it.

Now when you have small entities, the regulatory authority of the utility commissions is directed at the utility and it’s a large institution or if they screw something up, they’re gonna have the money to fix it. There’s some degree of risk when you bring in smaller players that have a future commitment because that’s what demand responds is I’m gonna pay you now, but if I need you later, you’re gonna be there. Well that’s like insurance, right? And we know that insurance is regulated because if I send somebody money for life insurance for 30 years and when I kick the bucket they don’t have any money, well that’s a problem. So there, there’s some things you have to do and the statutes aren’t really designed. You need some consumer protections but at the same time you need a little wild west where you really drive innovation and you really get experiment and you need to watch the crazy go on and there’s gonna be some abuse in the crazy that’s human nature and then corral it in. Once it starts directing, you rationalize it on the back end instead of put people on a straight jacket and tell ’em that he can’t do, let ’em do anything for a little while and then start to reign them in. That’s a way that to me is more consistent with getting innovation.

But what’s really frustrating sometimes the utilities is they’ll say if you offer something we should do demand response. The utility will say, well we should be the only ones that do that. Then my response is to why the hell aren’t you doing it? Go do it because I got other people that say they can risk their money and do it and you’re telling me I said tell them no. And then you come back to me and say you can’t do it. Let the person with their own money take that risk and try to do it and then to keep them accountable, let the utility do it. Then you’ve got two offerings. That’s we, we’ve got green tariffs that our utilities do. They use that to compete with our third party solar. They elevate their game too when you’ve gotten the third parties and what drives it all consumer choice. That’s what should drive it all.

If it’s cheaper to do it on roofs, do it on roofs. If it’s cheaper to put it in a field and let people do it as a group, do it like that, but identify the metric, how much does it cost in other people and have rigorous examination of that. Not this is what the utility says, this is what the utility says and this is what experts that disagree say when they have full access to the data and then come up with a region conclusion. They’re probably gonna have to tap the brakes because they have so much of it. But then, then when they tap the brakes, they shouldn’t tap the brakes on the bigger scale. Once you get it to where there’s no cost shift, you can floor it without regard to consequence until you get scaled intermittence problems and then you gotta deal with that.

Now that’s closer in California, they’re already seeing some of that, but in most of the rest of the country, I mean we can floor it in solar if we can mitigate the cost to keep that reasonable. But I don’t see that metric floating around. I suspect, I know in Arkansas they hate that metric because the number’s really, really low. And so they’re using the cost shift, which there’s some legitimacy because of the economics of fixed cost, to protect their monopoly. That’s what they’re doing. They’re using that as the tip of the spear when their real motivation is on the other end of the deal. But because of that, you don’t wanna get in a situation when it’s scaled and it becomes, begins to become unfair to the non-participants. But that’s a data thing and if it’s $5 and you ask a hundred people, you’re gonna get some different opinions. Of course, the higher it gets, the more opinions are gonna shift one way and the lower it gets, the more opinions gonna shift the other way. That’s why they hide the metric here. And I haven’t seen that metric in California. I followed like through the trade press, which isn’t that far in the weeds, but if I were arguing for change in that metering, I would grab that metric and I would put it out there. That hasn’t happened, so I don’t know what that number is. I hope that was responsive to your question.