



Monopoly Power and the Decline of Small Business

The Case for Restoring America's Once Robust Antitrust Policies

By Stacy Mitchell
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Local Self-Reliance

About the Institute for Local Self-Reliance

The Institute for Local Self-Reliance (ILSR) is a 42-year-old national nonprofit research and educational organization. ILSR's mission is to provide innovative strategies, working models, and timely information to support strong, community rooted, environmentally sound, and equitable local economies. To this end, ILSR works with citizens, policy makers, and businesses to design systems, policies, and enterprises that meet local needs; to maximize human, material, natural, and financial resources; and to ensure that the benefits of these systems and resources accrue to all local citizens.

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About this Paper

This paper is one of seven papers in the Report on Antitrust and Entrepreneurship, which is part of an American Antitrust Institute (AAI) project, made possible by a grant from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation. The Report's papers examine the important relationship between entrepreneurial activity and competition policy and enforcement. The AAI's focus on antitrust and entrepreneurship is motivated by the importance of entrepreneurial activity for competition and economic growth. Recent research documents the slowing pace of entry into the economy by new firms and the increasing rate of failure of many early-stage firms. There are growing indications that these outcomes may be linked to growing consolidation. However, theoretical and practical limitations inherent to existing antitrust analysis tend to systematically undervalue entrepreneurial activity. Questions concerning the relationship of antitrust and entrepreneurship are therefore ripe for analysis. To learn more about the project and read the other papers, visit www.antitrustinstitute.org/entrepreneurship-report

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Summary

The United States is much less a nation of entrepreneurs than it was a generation ago. Small, independent businesses have declined sharply in both numbers and market share across many sectors of the economy. Starting a new business appears to have become harder than ever. The number of startups launched annually has fallen by nearly half since the 1970s.

This paper argues that the decline of small business and entrepreneurship is owed, in significant part, to anticompetitive behavior by dominant corporations, which routinely use their size and market power to undermine and exclude their smaller rivals. These abuses have gone unchecked in recent decades because of a radical change in the ideological framework that guides antitrust enforcement. About thirty-five years ago, policy makers came to view maximizing efficiency, rather than maintaining fair and open markets for all competitors, as the goal of antitrust. This ideological shift impacted more than antitrust enforcement. It infused much of economic policy with a bias in favor of big business, creating an environment less hospitable to entrepreneurs.

There are at least three compelling reasons to bring a commitment to fair and open markets for small businesses back into antitrust policy:

- Small businesses deliver distinct consumer and market benefits, and in some sectors provide more value and better outcomes than their bigger competitors. And they often achieve these superior results because of their small scale, not in spite of it.
- An economy populated by many small, independent businesses produces a more equitable distribution of income and opportunity, creates more jobs, and supports an expansive middle class.
- Small-scale enterprise is compatible with democracy, while concentrated economic power threatens our liberty and our ability to be a self-governing people.

To restore competition and America's entrepreneurial tradition, we can draw on our own rich antimonopoly history. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, reformers enacted policies to break up concentrated power and ensure a level playing field for small businesses. These laws are still on the books, and the principles they embody are still relevant. With a fresh look at how we enforce them, these policies can go a long way toward reviving competition and small business. This paper concludes by outlining several specific steps for doing so.

A Tale of Pharmacy Competition: How One State is Not Like the Others

Nathan Schlecht knows almost everyone who comes through the doors of his pharmacy in Forman, North Dakota. He's been the pharmacist serving this remote community since 1998, when he and his wife bought Forman Drug from the town's retiring pharmacist.

Forman is a tiny settlement, with just 509 residents, situated in North Dakota's sparsely populated southeast corner. Aside from the rural health clinic that operates half-days, the itinerant optometrist, and the dentist who rents space at the back of Forman Drug one day a week, Schlecht is the town's only health care provider. He's the person on call when the local nursing home has questions about medications. He gives presentations on health issues at the local school and city hall. He does in-depth consultations with patients to talk through treatment approaches for chronic diseases like diabetes. A few years after taking over Forman Drug, he opened a telepharmacy ten miles up the road in Gwinner, and makes the drive once or twice a day to deliver prescriptions. "A lot of my decisions are based on what is needed in my community," says Schlecht.¹

Today, North Dakota has more pharmacies per capita than any other state, and there is not a single Walgreens or Walmart pharmacy among them. Aside from a handful of grandfathered chain outlets, all of the state's 177 pharmacies are independent businesses.

Independent, locally owned pharmacies like Forman Drug have become rare in much of the country, as drugstore chains, big-box retailers, and mail-order providers increasingly dominate the sector.² But North Dakota is a remarkable exception to this trend. In 1963, the state adopted a law that says that a drugstore may operate in the state only if it is owned by a pharmacist.³ This is unique in the United States, but many European countries have similar laws. The goal of the law is to ensure that pharmacies are run by people whose first priority is providing health care in their communities, not expanding the bottom line of a distant corporation. Today, North Dakota has more pharmacies per capita than any other state, and there is not a single Walgreens or Walmart pharmacy among them. Aside from a handful of grandfathered chain outlets, all of the state's 177 pharmacies are independent businesses.⁴

Given the conventional wisdom about the relative inefficiency of small business, one might assume that North Dakota's law has led to higher prescription prices. But the state has among the lowest drug prices in the country. Over the last five years, it has ranked thirteenth on average for lowest prescription prices among the fifty states.⁵ Compared to neighboring South Dakota, where both drugstore chains and big-box stores with pharmacies are common, North Dakota boasts lower prescription prices, and prices there have also been growing much more slowly than in South Dakota.⁶

Residents of North Dakota are getting more value for their dollar, too. In national surveys of customer satisfaction, independent pharmacies consistently outperform chains and mail-order providers. "Independents...

earned readers' top marks for speed and accuracy, courtesy and helpfulness, and pharmacists' knowledge," noted *Consumer Reports* in a January 2014 story.⁷ Independent pharmacies have shorter wait times and fewer out-of-stock drugs, the magazine found, and their patients receive more one-on-one time with the pharmacist. "Customers at independents were much more likely to have discussed prescriptions with their pharmacist," the analysis noted.⁸ J.D. Power's 2013 *Pharmacy Study* reached similar conclusions.⁹

North Dakota residents also benefit from an unparalleled level of access and competition. The state has more pharmacies per capita than any other state—thirty percent more than the national average—and they are remarkably prevalent even in the most remote regions.¹⁰ North Dakota's rural census tracts are fifty-one percent more likely to have a pharmacy than those in South Dakota, which has a similar population

distribution.¹¹ North Dakota's urban residents, meanwhile, enjoy more competition. In North Dakota's two biggest cities, Fargo and Bismarck, there are 1.8 competing pharmacy firms per 10,000 people, compared to just 1.3 in Sioux Falls and Rapid City, the largest cities in South Dakota.¹²

How is it that independent pharmacies are so competitive in North Dakota and yet have been rapidly losing ground everywhere else? If independents can beat the chains on price, service, and access in North Dakota, then they should be able to do that in Nebraska and New York, too. The likely



answer to this puzzle has to do with pharmacy benefit management companies, or PBMs, and the ways they use their market power to exclude local pharmacies from competing. Although largely invisible to consumers, PBMs play a pivotal role in the healthcare system by managing prescription benefits for insurers. Just two PBMs—Express Scripts and CVS Health—control seventy-five percent of the market, handling prescription benefits for more than 180 million Americans.¹³

Both of these companies have a stake in retail pharmacy. They each own mail-order pharmacy services, and CVS Health owns the nation's second largest drugstore chain. Not surprisingly, PBMs commonly provide incentives such as lower copays to steer patients to their own pharmacies, while offering independent drugstores take-it-or-leave-it contracts that force them to choose between losing money on many of the prescriptions they fill or being left out of an insurer's network altogether.¹⁴ As Brian Caswell, owner of Wolkar Drug in Baxter Springs, Kansas, told CNN Money: "The contracts have become egregious, with 15 to 20 pages of legal documents and red tape that we can't understand. As the PBM industry has shrunk to a handful of companies, they take more and more and give us less and less."¹⁵

North Dakota's pharmacists have to deal with PBMs too, but because they are the only pharmacies in the state, they have the leverage to negotiate fairer terms. The state's pharmacy ownership law has, in effect, filled the vacuum left by the failure of antitrust policy to promote and maintain an open and competitive market.

Although independent pharmacies are healthy and stable in North Dakota, across the rest of the United States their numbers have been falling, and their market share has dropped to twenty-eight percent.¹⁶ That is bad news for health care and for our communities. Independent pharmacies provide

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a variety of health screenings and counseling services that mail-order providers and many chain drugstores do not, and often at prices much lower than those charged by doctors' offices and hospitals.¹⁷

Although there have been repeated calls for federal legislation to level the playing field for community drugstores—by compelling PBMs to deal fairly or forcing them to divest their retail pharmacies—so far these efforts have gone nowhere. Attempts to convince the Federal Trade Commission

(FTC) to take a tougher stance on PBMs have likewise fallen on deaf ears. “The FTC has brought no enforcement actions against PBMs in spite of numerous complaints. None. In fact when a Federal Judge asked the FTC to investigate egregious conduct by CVS Caremark [now CVS Health] in excluding a community pharmacy...from continued participation in [its] network, the FTC declined to do so,” reports David Balto, an antitrust attorney and previous enforcement officer at both the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC.¹⁸ Indeed, the agency has gone further: In several states, the FTC has actively opposed legislation designed to make PBMs more transparent and prevent conflicts of interest in how they manage benefits.¹⁹

The FTC contends such legislation “likely will raise the cost of prescription drug coverage” by limiting the leverage PBMs have to negotiate lower prices from both drug makers and pharmacies.²⁰ But the evidence, in North Dakota and nationally, is to the contrary. PBMs are using their market power to steer more business to their own retail pharmacies and to secure kickbacks from drug manufacturers by favoring certain drugs over others.²¹ The result is a less diverse, competitive, and responsive pharmacy market, and a more expensive one.” PBM profits are increasing at the same time drug costs increase,” notes Balto.²²

The FTC’s insistence that there is nothing amiss in this sector is emblematic of the wide gulf that has opened up between the assumptions that guide antitrust enforcement today—including the notion that gains in efficiency justify high levels of concentration—and the actual consequences of allowing markets to become increasingly devoid of small-scale entrepreneurs.



The Decline of Small Business

The United States is much less a nation of entrepreneurs than it was a generation ago. Independent businesses have been disappearing across many sectors of the economy.

This paper argues that this decline is, to a significant extent, the result of a pervasive bias in favor of large corporations that crept into government policy beginning about thirty-five years ago. In particular, it contends that changes in how we enforce antitrust laws have left small businesses vulnerable to being excluded by dominant firms and that the decline of entrepreneurship has far-reaching implications for the economy and democracy. It presents a case for bringing a commitment to small business back into competition policy and outlines steps for doing so.

Before delving into this argument, let's take a look at the recent trends. Between 1997 and 2012, the number of small construction firms declined

by about 15,000, while the number of small manufacturers fell by more 70,000.²³ Local retailers also saw their ranks diminish by about 108,000—a drop of forty percent when measured relative to population.²⁴ As recently as the 1980s, independent retailers supplied about half of the goods Americans bought in stores; today their share is down to about one-quarter.²⁵ The number of community banks and credit unions has likewise fallen, dropping from 26,000 to 13,000 since 1995.²⁶ These local financial institutions held nearly half of bank assets twenty years ago, but today they control just twenty-three percent.²⁷ All told, between 1997 and 2012, the share of total business revenue going to firms with fewer than 100 employees fell by nearly one-fifth, from twenty-nine to twenty-four percent.²⁸



Meanwhile, unprecedented levels of market concentration have spread to every corner of the economy. One company makes nearly every brand of sunglasses in the world, while another produces virtually every plastic clothes hanger.²⁹ Supermarket aisles might appear to offer a wide range of brands, but most are owned by a handful of firms. Just two companies

make seventy percent of our beer; one company processes more than one-third of U.S. milk; and four companies slaughter and process over eighty percent of U.S. beef.³⁰ In finance, the share of banking assets held by megabanks rose from seventeen percent in 1995 to fifty-nine percent

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today.³¹ In retail, Walmart now captures one of every four dollars Americans spend on groceries, including more than half of grocery sales in forty metropolitan areas.³² Online retail is even more consolidated. Amazon accounts for more than thirty-five percent of online sales in the United States and is rapidly expanding its share.³³ In 2015, Amazon captured fifty-one percent of the growth in online spending.³⁴

In 2010, the DOJ tacitly accepted this massing of market power by officially raising the threshold at which it considers an industry to be highly concentrated for the purpose of evaluating mergers. (In doing so, the Department noted that it was simply aligning its formal guidelines with what had already been happening in practice for some time.) Even under

the new threshold, one-third of industries are still “highly concentrated,” according to an analysis by the *Wall Street Journal*.³⁵ A new wave of proposed mergers—between beer giants, hotel chains, pharmacy chains, and others—threatens to make many industries even more consolidated.³⁶

In this environment, starting a new entrepreneurial venture appears to have become harder than ever. Although startups are central to Americans’ self-image as a nation, especially in this high-tech age, new business creation has in fact declined sharply. The number of startups launched each year fell by nearly half between 1978 and 2011, according to a Brookings

Institution study. And the decline has been picking up speed. “The precipitous drop since 2006 is both noteworthy and disturbing,” the study’s authors, Ian Hathaway and Robert E. Litan, report, adding that “the number of business deaths now exceed business births for the first



time in the 30-plus year history of our data.”³⁷ Their research also shows that the trend is not confined to any region; business dynamism has declined in all fifty states and in all but a handful of more than 360 U.S. metropolitan areas.

As stunning as these figures are, there has been remarkably little public debate about this profound structural shift taking place in the U.S. economy. We tend to accept the decline of small business as the inevitable result of market forces. Big companies are thought to be more efficient and productive; therefore, although we may miss the corner drugstore or the family-owned auto repair shop, their demise is unavoidable, and it’s economically beneficial.

But North Dakota’s experience with its thriving and highly effective independent pharmacies raises a different, and very troubling, explanation for the dwindling ranks of small businesses. It suggests that their decline is owed, at least in part, to the anticompetitive exercise of market power by dominant corporations. And it offers evidence that the most significant threat to America’s entrepreneurs is not technological change or global trade, but rather the rise of an economic and political ideology that has discounted the harmful effects of monopoly power and infused public policy with a bias in favor of big business.

How Public Policy Came to Favor Big Business

It all started more than thirty-five years ago, when policy makers, influenced by the theories of economists and legal scholars associated with the University of Chicago, began systematically refashioning antitrust policy and enforcement. The election of Ronald Reagan was pivotal.

“I have no hostility against large mergers,” declared William Baxter, Reagan’s choice to run the DOJ’s Antitrust Division. He characterized the new approach to antitrust as “an exclusive concern with economic efficiency” and said that regulators would no longer be “concerned with fairness to smaller competitors,” as had been the case during prior administrations of both political parties.³⁸ Under Baxter, enforcement was sharply curtailed and new merger guidelines, adopted in 1982, stressed the potential efficiencies that might be gained from corporate consolidation,

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while dismissing other considerations, such as the economic and civic costs communities incur when they lose a locally owned and headquartered company to a merger.



The DOJ and the FTC also largely abandoned enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act. Adopted in 1936 in response to the emergence and growth of national retail chains like A&P,³⁹ the law embodies an explicit goal of protecting a level playing field for small competitors, particularly with regard to powerful buyers that could use their sway over suppliers to game markets. This clearly articulated intent made it hard to reinterpret Robinson-Patman to fit the new era in antitrust enforcement, in which efficiency supplanted fair markets as the primary goal. Few changes in competition policy have had as much impact on the landscape and daily life of America's communities: Robinson-Patman was shelved just as Walmart was marching out of Arkansas on its way to overtaking the national economy, in no small part by using its vast leverage over suppliers to shift production and distribution in ways that enlarged its market position and undermined smaller businesses.⁴⁰

Although the conservative movement played a central role in this sea change, many liberals, notably the influential economist John Kenneth Galbraith, also supported it, arguing that antitrust was outdated.⁴¹ A modern economy ought to be composed of large, technocratic corporations, the

The larger dominant companies become, the more political muscle they have to defend these policy advantages and push for new ones.

thinking went, and the role of government is to maximize economic growth and ensure lower prices for consumers, which large companies are better able to deliver. And so, with support from a key block of liberals, policy makers stripped antitrust of its longstanding commitment to maintaining open, diverse markets and protecting the liberty of citizens as producers, not merely as consumers. As an outgrowth of its increasingly narrow focus on prices, antitrust enforcement also became heavily reliant on mathematical modeling, which has led enforcers to further marginalize other values that cannot easily be quantified.

This preference for big business eventually spread beyond antitrust to influence virtually all policy governing the economy. Major changes to federal banking policies in the 1990s ushered in a tsunami of mergers

and put small banks on increasingly precarious footing.⁴² Changes to telecommunications policy in the 1990s opened the way for big media firms to take over local markets.⁴³ Agricultural policy has likewise heavily subsidized large commodity growers, while shortchanging small farms.⁴⁴ Each year local governments give out billions of dollars in tax incentives to support economic development, with upwards of ninety percent of these subsidies going to big companies.⁴⁵

Federal and state tax laws further distort the market. A neighborhood bicycle shop cannot stash profits in a Delaware shell company or undertake a foreign “inversion,” but large corporations routinely devise and exploit such loopholes. As a result, small businesses appear to pay higher effective tax rates, on average, than big companies do.⁴⁶ And, of course, the larger dominant companies become, the more political muscle they have to defend these policy advantages and push for new ones.

The Case for Committing to Fair and Open Markets for Small Business

All of this adds up to a political economy that has become inhospitable to independent business. Because their disappearance fits our assumptions about smaller businesses being less competitive and efficient than big firms, we have tended to overlook the significant role of government policy in driving this trend. It is time to take a fresh look at these assumptions. There are at least three compelling reasons why we should bring a commitment to protecting fair and open markets for small businesses back into antitrust specifically and into policymaking more broadly.

1. SMALL BUSINESSES DELIVER MORE VALUE IN MANY SECTORS

Just as independent pharmacies like Forman Drug are more responsive to the needs and interests of their patients, so too do small businesses in many sectors deliver more overall value and better outcomes. And, importantly, they often achieve these superior results because of their small scale, not in spite of it. Three examples help illustrate this important point.

Community banking

The first example is the banking sector. A wealth of evidence indicates that community banks⁴⁷ outperform megabanks across several critical measures. These small, local institutions are less expensive, for example. On checking accounts and other services, community banks charge fees that are roughly twenty-five percent lower on average than those charged by big banks.⁴⁸ How do small banks win on price? Not by providing less sophisticated services; most community banks offer mobile banking and other leading-edge features. The main reason for their lower costs is that small banks are not saddled with the top-heavy bureaucracy of large banks. Indeed, the most efficient size for a bank is under \$10 billion in assets, according to the International Monetary Fund's former chief economist, Simon Johnson, citing a raft of scholarship on the subject.⁴⁹ More than three-quarters of U.S. bank assets are now held by banks bigger than this, often much bigger: JP Morgan Chase, for example, is 240 times larger than this optimal size.



Community banks also do a better job of judging and managing risk than megabanks do. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, researchers found that local banks were far less likely to have issued mortgages that borrowers had trouble paying back, and that foreclosure rates were lower in counties with greater community bank presence.⁵⁰ Indeed, local banks consistently post lower default rates across their loan portfolios, despite funding more borrowers that fall outside of big banks' standardized lending formulas.⁵¹

Another critical advantage of local banks is that they devote a larger share of their resources to productive lending. Megabanks, on the other hand, are more engaged in speculative trading that is of little value to the real economy. This difference is particularly striking in the context of small-business lending. Although community banks and credit unions control only twenty-three percent of industry assets, they supply sixty percent of

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all bank lending to new and growing businesses, a major source of net job growth.⁵² In contrast, the top four banks—Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo—have nearly forty percent of assets but provide just thirteen percent of small business lending.⁵³ As a result, places with a greater prevalence of local banks have more startups and

stronger economic growth. “Lower banking concentration is associated with greater [rates of business] entry” and “more firms in operation,” the economists Nicola Cetorelli and Philip E. Strahan found in a 2006 study.⁵⁴

Despite the many ways that community banks better fulfill our banking needs, these institutions have nevertheless seen their ranks shrink dramatically, a trend that is largely the result of the dismantling of our once robust antimonopoly policies. During the 1990s, Congress threw out Depression-era banking laws that kept banks focused on meeting the needs of their regions.⁵⁵ At the same time, federal regulators systematically preempted state laws that had ensured fair dealing and protected small banks from exclusion, opening the way for big banks to use their control of electronic funds transfer networks and other essential infrastructure to impose excessive fees and other barriers on local financial institutions.⁵⁶ An unprecedented period of mergers and consolidation followed these policy changes. As big banks grew larger, they gained another policy-driven competitive advantage. The fact that government cannot let these sprawling institutions fail provides a kind of taxpayer-funded insurance policy for their investors, which allows big banks to raise capital at costs lower than those available to community banks.⁵⁷ All of this has worked to create a market in which local banks are losing ground, not because they can’t compete and offer as much or more value, but because policy has created a rigged game that favors big financial institutions.

Internet access


Another example of a sector in which small companies deliver more value is Internet access. Here again we find a highly concentrated market in which small firms appear to offer superior service and yet struggle to gain a toehold against powerful incumbents. Consider the example of LightTUBE, a fiber-to-the-home broadband network in Tullahoma, Tennessee. It is one of dozens of small citywide networks that provide higher data speeds at lower prices than are charged by Time Warner Cable, Comcast, and AT&T, which together control nearly sixty percent of the national market.⁵⁸ Launched in 2008 by Tullahoma’s municipal utility, LightTUBE has repeatedly increased speeds without raising

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rates.⁵⁹ Today, it offers 30-megabit-per-second (Mbps) service for about \$40 a month, and one-gigabit service for less than \$90 a month.⁶⁰ To get gigabit speeds in Fayetteville, about thirty miles up the road, business customers are paying Time Warner Cable upwards of \$500 per month.⁶¹

LightTUBE would like to expand its services beyond the city limits, perhaps eventually to Fayetteville. And, given Tullahoma's much faster job growth, which appears to be linked to its superior broadband, Fayetteville residents and businesses are eager for the option.⁶² But, in order for LightTUBE to do so, the state would need to remove limits on the ability of publicly owned networks to offer services beyond their electrical footprint. (Companies like AT&T and Time Warner Cable are already free to operate

across the entire state.) Tullahoma's state senator, Janice Bowling, has introduced several bills that would do just that, but each time, attorneys from AT&T have lobbied aggressively and succeeded in blocking the proposed legislation.⁶³ Elsewhere, big cable and phone companies have gone even further. In twenty states, they have pushed through promonopoly laws that bar or severely restrict local governments and public utilities from launching broadband networks to serve their communities.⁶⁴



Innovation in multiple sectors

The third example of how small firms deliver more value is the crucial role they play in innovation across many sectors of the economy. When markets become so concentrated that small businesses are marginalized and the entry of startups is impeded, the pace of innovation slows. These losses are often invisible: We cannot know what inventive new products and services are missing as a consequence.

Small firms play a crucial role in innovation in two ways. The first is direct. Research has shown that industries populated by small businesses generate new products and processes at a faster clip than those consisting of a few large companies.⁶⁵ When small firms become few and far between, as has happened in many sectors, the conditions are no longer optimal for innovation. In today's highly concentrated markets, even when small businesses do succeed in developing a breakthrough product, dominant corporations can block their path to market. One particularly egregious example involved the small startup Retractable Technologies, which invented a revolutionary syringe that eliminates accidental needle sticks, and then spent eighteen years trying to overcome a monopoly incumbent that offered an inferior product.⁶⁶

The second way that small businesses drive innovation is by creating diverse pathways to market that enable new products to find an audience. Independent retailers, in particular, have long played an outsized role in identifying and introducing new products to consumers. This has been well documented in the book industry, where many beloved books and authors

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owe their initial success to recommendations by a few local bookstores. More recently, market surveys have found that readers browsing in an independent bookstore “discover” new books at about three times the rate they do while shopping on Amazon.⁶⁷ This same phenomenon is evident in many retail categories. Inventive, award-winning new toys, for example, originate mostly from small toy manufacturers, which in turn depend heavily on independent toy stores to carry these toys and put them in shoppers’ hands.⁶⁸

Yet, despite the ways that industries consisting of a wide range of businesses better support innovation, current antitrust doctrine has shown little concern for this type of marketplace diversity. Industries with only a few firms are often deemed to be sufficiently competitive and open to new entrants, even though the experiences of innovators like Retractable Technologies suggest otherwise. Regulators have also discounted the value of diversity in distribution and retailing, opting not to interfere when big retailers extort special treatment from suppliers or engage in predatory loss-leader strategies to the detriment of their small competitors.

The impact of this is particularly striking in the food sector. Even as consumer demand for local and artisanal food soars, high levels of concentration in both production and retailing are stunting small-scale producers.⁶⁹ Craft brewers, for example, may be popular with beer drinkers, but in many states they struggle to secure sufficient shelf space because distribution is tightly controlled by their giant competitors. The world’s largest beer producer, Anheuser-Busch InBev, provides lucrative incentives to distributors whose sales volume is made up of at least ninety-five percent of the beer giant’s brands and who limit their offerings from small breweries.⁷⁰

2. ENTREPRENEURSHIP IS ESSENTIAL TO BROAD PROSPERITY AND AN EXPANSIVE MIDDLE CLASS

A second reason to restore our robust antimonopoly tradition, with its commitment to diverse markets and small-scale enterprise, is that an economy in which power and ownership are broadly distributed also tends to more broadly distribute income. Indeed, after more than thirty years of consolidation premised on the idea that bigger companies would generate more prosperity, most Americans are not in fact better off. Incomes have stagnated for all but the wealthiest, and economic inequality has reached levels not seen since the Gilded Age.⁷¹ Job creation rates have plummeted, while growing numbers of Americans rely on precarious “on-demand” freelance work rather than full-time, permanent jobs.⁷²



All of these trends can be traced, in part, to concentration. Yet current competition policy does not recognize this. It is hamstrung by its narrow focus on efficiency and its inclination to see people merely as consumers—that is, the economic welfare of individuals measured solely as a function of the prices we pay. But we are also producers of value. How well we are doing as producers—what we are earning as workers and entrepreneurs—has at least as much or more impact on our well-being as how we are faring as consumers.

During the middle decades of the 20th century, when prosperity was relatively broadly distributed across the income spectrum (though still not equitably shared by women and people of color),⁷³ starting a small business or getting a union-wage production job were two of the most effective pathways for moving into the middle class, particularly for immigrants, those unable to afford college, and others on the economic margins. But as regulators have come to favor consolidation, allowing a handful of giant companies to gain control of large swaths of the economy, these avenues have been increasingly cut off.⁷⁴

Consolidation has not only left more people stuck at the bottom; it has also funneled more of the nation's income to those at the very top. Although small businesses tend to support a relatively large number of middle-income positions,⁷⁵ big publicly traded firms distribute much of their revenue to a small class of top executives and shareholders. They are under constant pressure to deliver even more by cutting labor costs in the middle and lower ends of the job hierarchy. In a 2015 study,

Current competition policy is hamstrung by its narrow focus on efficiency and its inclination to see people merely as consumers. But how well we are doing as producers—what we are earning as workers and entrepreneurs—has at least as much or more impact on our well-being as how we are faring as consumers.

three economists looked at thirty years of data across fifteen countries and found that, as small and medium-size businesses give way to large companies, the gap between rich and poor expands.⁷⁶ The economists—Holger M. Mueller, Paige P. Ouimet, and Elena Simintzi—explained that, while large companies pay more, on average, than smaller firms, this disparity is entirely driven by salaries at the top. At big companies, people in low- and medium-skilled positions earn the same or less than their counterparts at smaller firms, while those at the top earn much more. In highly concentrated economies, like the United States, inequality has expanded dramatically, the study found, whereas, in countries where the market share of small and medium-size businesses has held steady, inequality has not grown much.⁷⁷

A decentralized economy populated by many small, locally owned businesses also ensures that economic opportunities extend to every region. As Phillip Longman and Brian S. Feldman have both observed, many American cities, such as St. Louis, were once flourishing economic centers, home to thousands of locally owned companies, including distinct, homegrown industry clusters that could compete nationally.⁷⁸ This local control of business nurtured local talent and fostered thriving regional networks of trade and commerce, as locally owned firms sourced goods and services from one another. But, as government embraced consolidation, economic opportunity and market clout shifted to a small number of dominant cities, leaving much of the rest of the country behind. Over time, Longman and Feldman both note, a yawning gap in household income and wealth has opened up between cities like New York and San Francisco, on the one hand, and places like St. Louis and Cleveland, on the other.

Indeed, places that have managed to skirt the consolidation trend, keeping a large share of their economy in the hands of small, locally owned businesses, are more prosperous, with faster income growth and lower

It's clear that antitrust policy governs more than markets. It also shapes the character of society and the operation of democracy.

poverty rates, according to research by Anil Rupasingha, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.⁷⁹ Local ownership also appears to influence business decisions in ways that enhance community resiliency. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for instance, New Orleans' locally owned businesses reopened much sooner than national chains, some of which opted not to return for years, if at all.⁸⁰ Other research has found that, during recessions, small firms lay off fewer employees than large companies do.⁸¹

Consolidation is also impairing the U.S. economy's ability to create jobs. During the expansion of 2000 to 2007, the United States created *one-third* as many jobs as during the previous expansion, in the 1990s.⁸² One likely culprit is the sharp drop-off in the number of startups. "New and young companies are the primary source of job creation in the American economy," observe Jason Wiens and Chris Jackson of the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, citing data showing that recent startups account for nearly all net job growth.⁸³ Today's economy is marked by worrisome structural problems, they write, including "high rates of unemployment and underemployment, and a 'missing generation' of firms"—businesses that would have been created had startup rates kept pace. They add, "These factors are a drag on the economy, sapping dynamism."⁸⁴

3. DISPERSING ECONOMIC POWER SAFEGUARDS DEMOCRACY

The third, and arguably most important, reason to reorient competition policy is that small-scale enterprise is compatible with democracy, while concentrated economic power threatens our liberty and our ability to be a self-governing people. This was well understood by the early Americans. The Boston Tea Party, after all, was as much about the power of the East India Co., and the favorable treatment this large multinational received from the British government, as it was about the authority of Parliament.⁸⁵ The conviction that political freedom and democracy can exist only when economic power is decentralized was a guiding principle of U.S. policy for many decades after the Revolution. As Franklin Roosevelt declared in 1938, “The liberty of a democracy is not safe if the people tolerate the growth of private power to a point where it becomes stronger than their democratic state itself.”⁸⁶

Today, we see widespread evidence of market power translating into political power, enabling dominant companies to subvert democracy. After sifting through more than 1,800 policies enacted since 1981, scholars at Princeton and Northwestern universities concluded that wealthy people and powerful corporate lobbies have far more influence on government than the majority of citizens.⁸⁷ As a result, much of public policy no longer aligns with the views and preferences of most Americans. “The central point that emerges from our research is that economic elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. government policy, while mass-based interest groups and average citizens have little or no independent influence,” they report.⁸⁸

Although centralizing economic power has a corrosive effect on democracy, diffusing it has the opposite impact. The more broadly economic decision-making is distributed, the more say people have over their livelihoods, and the more liberty they have to ply a trade independently, the more effective and engaged they are as citizens. Sociologists report that, all else being equal, communities with more locally owned businesses exhibit a greater ability to solve problems, and have higher levels of civic participation, including voting.⁸⁹ This may arise from any number of factors—the sense of belonging and connection that healthy Main Streets foster, or the leadership of local business owners themselves—but whatever the specific mechanisms, it’s clear that antitrust policy governs more than markets. It also shapes the character of society and the operation of democracy.

Amazon, Antitrust, and the Future of Entrepreneurship

If the three reasons outlined here—better economic outcomes, a more equitable distribution of income, and a healthier democracy—build a case for restoring a commitment to small independent business in antitrust policy, perhaps no other company better illustrates the risks of not doing so than Amazon.

Measured by market capitalization, Amazon is now the largest retailer in the country.⁹⁰ It already controls over thirty-five percent of e-commerce in the United States, and its share is projected to grow rapidly in the coming years.⁹¹ Amazon got its start as a book retailer and then moved into other categories, becoming one of the largest sellers of toys, electronics, clothing, and more.⁹² But Amazon is more than a big retailer. Increasingly it is also a manufacturer, competing directly with its suppliers, and it has emerged as the dominant platform in online commerce, which means that other sellers now depend on Amazon to reach their customers.

Both Amazon's history in the book industry and its more recent evolution as a platform are instructive for what they reveal about the shortcomings of current antitrust enforcement and the consequences for entrepreneurs, competition, and the public interest.

Today Amazon captures almost half of all new book sales.⁹³ It gained this position in part by using its size and clout to weaken competitors and wring concessions from publishers. It routinely sells books at a loss, for example, which has injured competing booksellers that lack other product lines or deep pockets to fall back on, including chains like Borders, which folded in 2011, and independent stores.⁹⁴ Amazon finances below-cost selling in part by extracting special fees from publishers. Those who decline to pay up face crippling retaliation, including the removal of the "buy" button from their titles, a tactic that can cause a publisher's revenue to plummet by forty percent or more.⁹⁵ Amazon also harms competition by publishing its own books and promoting these titles over those from other publishers.⁹⁶

By laying waste to a once diverse marketplace, Amazon has reduced opportunities for new ideas to enter the public sphere. Publishers have responded to Amazon's financial squeeze by cutting their investment in new books

and authors and focusing more on books by established authors.⁹⁷ Those debut authors who do make it into print have a more difficult time finding readers. Even though customers can buy virtually any title from Amazon, the more important question is how they learn about a book in the first place. Even with its large market share, Amazon accounts for only seven percent of new book discovery, while physical bookstores account for twenty percent.⁹⁸

Despite its effect on competition, Amazon has drawn little scrutiny from antitrust enforcers, because it offers low prices. In fact, when the DOJ did opt to intervene in the book industry, in 2012, it acted to strengthen Amazon's position. Two years before, in 2010, Apple had entered the market for e-books with the release of the iPad. At the time, Amazon had about ninety percent of the market for e-books.⁹⁹ With Apple now entering the market, several publishers switched to a commission pricing model for e-books, under which they set the retail prices of their books and offered Amazon, Apple, and other sellers a fixed commission. A similar approach has long been used for books in Germany, with

procompetitive results, including more publishers and titles published per capita than in the United States, as well as lower prices.¹⁰⁰ After publishers adopted commission pricing in the United States, Amazon's share of e-book sales fell to about sixty-five percent.¹⁰¹

In 2012, the DOJ filed suit, accusing the publishers and Apple of colluding—over an expensive dinner, no less—to put the new pricing model in place.¹⁰² Perhaps they did. But what does collusion mean, one wonders, when an internal meeting at Amazon entails as much market power assembled in one room as the heads of five publishing houses gathered for dinner? As part of the settlements it reached with the publishers, the DOJ suspended their use of the commission pricing model, allowing Amazon to once again sell e-books at a loss and thereby protect its market position from new competitors. Many industry observers were stunned by the DOJ's actions. "Imagine the shock when the bullet aimed at threats to competition went whizzing by Amazon—which not long ago had a 90 percent stranglehold on e-books—and instead, struck five of the six biggest publishers and Apple, a minor player in the realm of books," quipped *New York Times* media critic David Carr.¹⁰³



Unchecked by regulators, Amazon has used many of these same tactics to expand into other products and, over the last few years, has emerged as a powerful gatekeeper to the online market. Consider these remarkable figures: In 2009, eighteen percent of people looking to buy something online went directly to Amazon to search for the product. Most of the rest relied on search engines, which display results from an array of companies.¹⁰⁴ Today, just one-third of shoppers begin at a search engine. Almost half start at Amazon.¹⁰⁵ And that number will almost certainly soar as Amazon expands its Prime membership.¹⁰⁶

The practical effect of this is that many competing sellers—including other Internet retailers, brick-and-mortar stores that sell online, and manufacturers—are facing a Faustian bargain. Either they continue to hang their shingles out on a road less and less traveled, or they give in and become, as tens of thousands already have, third-party sellers on Amazon’s website.¹⁰⁷

Relying on your biggest competitor for access to the market is precarious, to say the least. Amazon controls a large component of its sellers’ costs through the fees it charges them to use its site. It also effectively sets a ceiling on the price at which they can sell their wares, because it can bring the same items into its own inventory and thereby set the going price. If it lowers the price of an item below cost, Amazon forces a seller to either lose money or forgo sales. Even the savviest entrepreneurs cannot defend against such tactics.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, the more astute the seller—the more expertise she has about her industry, products, and customers—the more value she delivers to Amazon, which not only acquires her knowledge by monitoring her inventory and sales, but owns all of her customer data.

For businesses that manage to bypass this juggernaut and find their own way to market, Amazon has a track record of using its size to crush them and take their business. When the upstart firm behind Diapers.com emerged as a vigorous competitor in diaper sales, Amazon offered to buy the company and then, when the founders declined to sell, slashed its diaper prices, offering Pampers and Huggies at prices below cost. According to reporting by Brad Stone, Amazon was prepared to lose \$100 million over three months in its bid to compel the company to sell.¹⁰⁹ It succeeded. Although Diapers.com and its sister sites, like Soap.com, remain standalone online stores with their own branding, they are now owned by Amazon.

Amazon thus embodies a new kind of economic power, made possible by its ability to leverage its vast digital network and the data that network generates. In other words, Amazon has gone from being one of the market’s leading retailers to having outsized influence over the terms that govern the market itself. Nor is Amazon’s ambition limited to goods. It extends to such essential infrastructure as cloud computing, media streaming, payments processing, and, most recently, freight shipping and logistics.¹¹⁰

Unless antitrust policy begins to consider more than efficiency and short-term prices, the great technological leap offered by the advent of Internet retailing will not produce a flourishing market open to all entrepreneurs. Instead this new world of commerce will largely be under the domain of a single company that has the power to dictate terms to everyone else.

Conclusion: Restoring Competition and Entrepreneurship

As dismal as the current trends may seem, it’s worth remembering that we have been here before. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the U.S. economy was highly concentrated, with monopolies in oil, railroads, and other sectors impeding competition.

Reformers rose to the occasion, enacting policies to break up concentrated power, ensure a level playing field for small businesses, and protect the public interest. What followed was a period of vigorous competition, business dynamism, and broad prosperity. These laws are still on the books, and the principles they embody are still relevant. In fact, with a fresh look at how we enforce them, these existing policies

can go a long way toward addressing today's concentrated power and restoring competition and entrepreneurship. In particular, we should:

- Reinstate the broader set of aims that once guided antitrust, balancing efficiency goals with other objectives, including a commitment to open markets in which small businesses have a fair opportunity to compete.
- Update the merger guidelines to give greater weight to market structure and the impact of consolidation on new entrants and small-scale entrepreneurs.
- Do more to address market power outside of merger reviews by taking more enforcement actions against companies that unilaterally harm competition.
- Take a harder line against vertical integration, which can enable a dominant company to use its control of another part of the supply chain to exclude competitors, as the examples above in pharmacy, beer, and online retailing illustrate.
- Dust off the Robinson-Patman Act and once again put it to use to address the harmful effects of price discrimination on entrepreneurs that lack market power.
- Undertake a deep investigation of digital platforms like Amazon, with an eye toward extending common carriage rules to their operations, as policy makers did with utilities and railroads a century ago.



We should also remember that the tools for promoting competition are not limited to antitrust policy, but extend to other areas, such as banking regulation. Moreover, there are many relatively easy and immediate steps Congress could take to better protect entrepreneurs from monopoly power. Visa and MasterCard, for example, impose exorbitant fees on small businesses in the United States, but in much of Europe regulations cap what they can charge

Today our modern Gilded Age offers fewer opportunities for people to start a business and succeed than at any time in the nation's recent memory. That fact has broad consequences for the character of our society and the well-being of our economy and democracy. Fortunately, we can remedy this by drawing on our own rich history of antimonopoly policy, which once had fairness and open markets for entrepreneurs as a central aim.

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 56. One critical arena involved automated teller machines and the networks on which they operate. Control of these networks is dominated by large banks. By the early 1990s, several states had taken steps to ensure that big banks could not use fees or other terms to block access to these networks or impose excessive costs on small financial institutions. Iowa, for example, established common carriage rules for electronic banking networks and banned ATM surcharges. But at the behest of several national banks, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency, the nation’s chief banking regulator, declared that Iowa’s law and similar laws in other states were preempted. See Stacy Mitchell, *Rogue Agencies Gut State Banking Laws, New Rules Mag.*, Sept. 5, 2001, at 4, available at <https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/files/images/nrfall01.pdf>.
 57. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Large Bank Holding Companies: Expectations of Government Support (July 31, 2014) *Evidence from the Bond Market on Banks’ “Too Big To Fail” Subsidy*, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. Econ. Pol’y Rev., Mar. 2014, at 29.
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 59. Lisa Gonzalez, *Speedy Holiday Gift in Tullahoma*, Community Broadband Networks (Dec. 12, 2015), <https://muninetworks.org/taxonomy/term/347/all/content/att-groups-lawsuit-wisconsin-fails?page=2> (scroll to blog posting); Lisa Gonzalez, *LightTUBE Lowers the Price of a Gig; Increases Speeds for Free Again*, Community Broadband Networks (Dec. 17, 2014), <https://muninetworks.org/content/lighttube-lowers-price-gig-increases-speeds-free-again>.
 60. Tullahoma Utilities Board, *Internet*, <https://www.tub.net/internet> (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
 61. Allan Holmes, *How Big Telecom Smothers City-Run Broadband*, Center for Public Integrity (Aug. 28, 2014), <https://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/08/28/15404/how-big-telecom-smothers-city-run-broadband>.
 62. Tullahoma’s job growth lagged the state’s prior to LightTUBE’s launch in 2009. Since then, its job growth has outpaced the state’s and Fayetteville’s. Tullahoma, with 19,000 people, added almost 3,600 jobs between 2009 and 2014. *Id.* See also Robert Crandall, William Lehr & Robert Litan, *The Effects of Broadband Deployment on Output and Employment: A Cross-sectional Analysis of U.S. Data* (Brookings Institution, July 2007).
 63. Holmes, *supra* note 61.
 64. *Id.*
 65. Wilfred Dolfsma & Gerben van der Velde, *Industry Innovativeness, Firm Size, and Entrepreneurship: Schumpeter Mark III?*, 24 J. Evolutionary Econ. 713 (2014).
 66. Dayen, *supra* note 29.
 67. See, e.g., Laura Owen, *Why Online Book Discovery is Broken (and How to Fix It)*, GIGAOM (Jan. 17, 2013), <https://gigaom.com/2013/01/17/why-online-book-discovery-is-broken-and-how-to-fix-it/>.
 68. Stacy Mitchell, *The Growth of Internet Retailing: Implications and Strategies for the Specialty Toy Industry* (Am. Specialty Toy Retailing Ass’n, June 2011), <http://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/ASTRA-white-paper-final.pdf>.
 69. Diana L. Moss, *Consolidation in Agriculture and Food: Challenges for Competition Enforcement*, Concurrences Competition Law Review No. 1-2016, at 10.
 70. Diane Bartz, *Exclusive: U.S. Probes Allegations AB InBev Seeking to Curb Craft Beer Distribution*, Reuters (Oct. 12, 2015), <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-abinbev-doj-antitrust-exclusive-idUSKCN0S623R20151012>; Tripp Mickle, *Craft Brewers Take Issue with AB InBev Distribution Plan*, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 2015, at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/craft-brewers-take-issue-with-ab-inbev-distribution-plan-1449227668>.
 71. Between 1979 and 2013, wages for the top 1 percent of earners grew 138 percent, while the wages of the bottom 90 percent grew just 15 percent. Lawrence Mishel, Elise Gould & Josh Bivens, *Wage Stagnation in Nine Charts* (Econ. Pol’y Inst., Jan. 6, 2015), <http://www.epi.org/publication/charting-wage-stagnation/>; Paul Krugman, *Why We’re In a New Gilded Age*, N.Y. Rev. Books, May 8, 2014, at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/05/08/thomas-piketty-new-gilded-age/>; Estelle Sommeiller & Mark Price, *The Increasingly Unequal States of America: Income Inequality by State, 1917 to 2012* (Econ. Pol’y Inst., Jan. 26, 2015), <http://www.epi.org/publication/income-inequality-by-state-1917-to-2012/>.
 72. Barry C. Lynn & Phillip Longman, *Who Broke America’s Jobs Machine?*, Wash. Monthly, Mar./Apr. 2010, at <http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/marchapril-2010/who-broke-americas-jobs-machine-3/>; Noam Scheiber, *Growth in the “Gig Economy” Fuels Work Force Anxieties*, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2015, at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/13/business/rising-economic-insecurity-tied-to-decades-long-trend-in-employment-practices.html?_r=0.
 73. From the 1940s to the late 1970s, “workers from the lowest-paid wage earner to the highest-paid CEO experienced similar growth in incomes,” and the gap in income levels between those at the top and bottom ends of the spectrum narrowed. Sommeiller & Price, *supra* note 71.
 74. Gillian B. White, *Entrepreneurship: Increasingly, the Province of the Wealthy*, Atlantic, Sept. 9, 2015, at <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/entrepreneurship-increasingly-the-province-of-the-wealthy/404443/>. Increasing concentration has helped drive off-shoring as large, publicly traded firms almost invariably prioritize short-term investor profits over the needs of other stakeholders. See, e.g., Nelson

- D. Schwartz, *Carrier Workers See Costs, Not Benefits, of Global Trade*, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2016, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/business/economy/carrier-workers-see-costs-not-benefits-of-global-trade.html>.
75. Consider the difference between a town with forty locally owned retail businesses, each with its own manager-owner earning a middle-class income, and each sourcing services from other local businesses, thus supporting printers, bankers, graphic designers, and so on, and a town with a Walmart supercenter that employs just four managers at midlevel incomes and requires few local services.
76. Holger M. Mueller, Paige P. Ouimet & Elena Simintzi, *Wage Inequality and Firm Growth* (LIS Working Paper 632, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2540321.
77. *Id.* Another recent paper, written by Jason Furman and Peter Orszag, presents data showing that a small number of firms are now earning “supernormal” returns, a possible sign of monopoly power. These outsized returns are being distributed to an elite group of top-level employees and shareholders and, the authors surmise, may be a significant factor fueling inequality. Jason Furman & Peter Orszag, *A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the Rise in Inequality* (Presentation at A Just Society: Centennial Event in Honor of Joseph Stiglitz, Columbia Univ. Oct. 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20151016_firm_level_perspective_on_role_of_rents_in_inequality.pdf.
78. Brian S. Feldman, *The Real Reason Middle America Should Be Angry*, Wash. Monthly, Mar./Apr./May 2016, at <http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/maraprmay-2016/the-real-reason-middle-america-should-be-angry/>; Phillip Longman, *Bloom and Bust*, Wash. Monthly, Nov./Dec. 2015, at <http://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/novdec-2015/bloom-and-bust/>.
79. Anil Rupasingha, *Locally Owned: Do Local Business Ownership and Size Matter for Local Economic Well-Being?* (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta Community and Economic Discussion Paper No. 01-13, 2013), <https://www.frbatlanta.org/community-development/publications/discussion-papers/2013/01-do-local-business-ownership-size-matter-for-local-economic-well-being-2013-08-19.aspx>. A separate study analyzed 2,953 counties, including both rural and urban places, and found that, after controlling for other factors that influence growth, those with a larger density of small, locally owned businesses experienced greater per capita income growth between 2000 and 2007. The presence of large, nonlocal businesses, meanwhile, had a negative effect on incomes. Stephan Goetz & David Fleming, *Does Local Firm Ownership Matter?*, 25 ECON.DEV.Q.277 (2011).
80. Richard Campanella, *Street Survey of Business Reopenings in Post-Katrina New Orleans*, Tulane University, Jan. 2007, http://richcampanella.com/dev/assets/pdf/study_Campanella%20analysis%20of%20post-Katrina%20business%20reopenings%20in%20New%20Orleans.pdf.
81. Giuseppe Moscarini & Fabien Postel-Vinay, *The Contribution of Large and Small Employers to Job Creation in Times of High and Low Unemployment*, 102 AM.ECON.REV.2509 (2012).
82. Lynn & Longman, *supra* note 72.
83. Wiens & Jackson, *supra* note 52.
84. *Id.*
85. Nick Bunker, *An Empire on the Edge: How Britian Came to Fight America* (2015).
86. Franklin D. Roosevelt, *Message to Congress on the Concentration of Economic Power* (Apr. 29, 1938), available at <http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/academics/research/faculty-research/new-deal/roosevelt-speeches/fr042938.htm>.
87. Martin Gilens & Benjamin I. Page, *Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens*, 12 Persp. On Politics 564 (2014). See also David Callahan & J. Mijincha, *Stacked Deck: How the Dominance of Politics by the Affluent & Business Undermines Economic Mobility in America* (2013), <http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Demos-Stacked-Deck.pdf>.
88. Gilens & Page, *supra* note 87.
89. Troy C. Blanchard, Charles Tolbert & Carson Mencken, *The Health and Wealth of U.S. Counties: How the Small Business Environment Impacts Alternative Measures of Development*, 5 Cambridge J. Regions, Econ. & Soc’y 149 (2011); Troy Blanchard & Todd L. Matthews, *The Configuration of Local Economic Power and Civic Participation in the Global Economy*, 84 Soc. Forces 2241 (2006); Stephan J. Goetz & Anil Rupasingha, *Walmart and Social Capital*, 88 Am. J. Agric. Econ. 1304 (2006).
90. On April 6, 2016, Amazon’s stock was valued at \$280.4 billion. Walmart, the next largest retailer, was valued at \$215.1 billion.
91. Hough, *supra* note 33.
92. Over the last three years, Amazon has doubled its share of the toy market and is now neck and neck with the two category leaders, Target and Walmart. Lutz Muller, *The Western Toy Market*, Toy Directory (Feb. 1, 2015), <http://www.toydirectory.com/monthly/article.asp?id=5685>. Similarly, in electronics, Amazon has moved from the eighth to the third largest seller since 2009, closing in on leaders Best Buy and Walmart. See Ian King, *Apple Is Getting Beat by Amazon in Retail Gadget Sales, So Why Doesn’t It Care About CES?*, Bloomberg (Jan. 5, 2015), <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-02/amazon-reps-are-taking-over-ces-and-apple-is-practically-nowhere-to-be-found.html>. *On groceries: Amazon is Poised to Chew Up the Food Chain*, Bloomberg News, Mar. 17, 2016, <https://www.internetretailer.com/2016/03/17/amazon-poised-chew-food-chain>. *On apparel: Marc Bain, If You Think Amazon Is Huge Now, Wait Until It Becomes America’s Biggest Fashion Retailer*, Quartz (July 27, 2015), <http://qq.com/464578/if-you-think-amazon-is-huge-now-wait-until-it-becomes-americas-biggest-fashion-retailer/>.
93. Amazon sells sixty-five percent of new books sold online, and online sales now account for sixty-seven percent of all book sales, up from twenty-eight percent in 2010. See *Amazon Dominance at Monopoly Level Say Authors*, Bookshed (Jan. 28, 2016), <http://www.thebookshed.co.uk/amazon-dominance-at-monopoly-level-say-authors/>.
94. For its first twelve years in business, Amazon reported a cumulative loss of over \$700 million. Slim tonegative profit margins have continued in recent years, even as the company’s stock value has soared. In 2014, Amazon posted a loss of \$241 million. Amazon.com, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 17 (Jan. 29, 2015). For a discussion of Amazon’s pricing tactics in the book industry, see Ken Auletta, *Paper Trail*, Newyorker, June 25, 2015, at <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/06/25/paper-trail-2>.
95. In 2014, after the publisher Hachette refused Amazon’s demand for additional fee payments, Amazon stopped taking preorders, delayed shipping, and eliminated discounts on Hachette’s books. It also modified its search engine to steer customers away from Hachette titles. These tactics drove down sales by fifty to ninety percent. Letter from Authors United to William J. Baer, Ass’t Attorney General, U.S. DOJ (July 14, 2015), available at <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/13/business/document-amazon-book-practices.html>. Amazon has similarly suspended sales of books published by Macmillan and Melville House during contract disputes. Another effort to extract fees targeted small publishers and was known internally as the Gazelle Project after Amazon’s CEO Jeff Bezos said “that Amazon should approach these small publishers the way a cheetah would pursue a sickly gazelle.” Brad Stone, *The Everything Store: Jeff Bezos and the Age of Amazon* 243 (2013).

96. Jane Litte, *Has Everyone Conceded the U.S. Ebook Market to Amazon?*, Dear Author (Mar. 9, 2014), <http://dearauthor.com/ebooks/has-everyone-conceded-the-us-ebook-market-to-amazon/>. Authors who agree to publish and sell their books exclusively through Amazon receive even better terms and placement. Saabira Chaudhuri, *Amazon's Kindle-Exclusive Books Surge Past 100 Million Mark*, Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 2012, at <http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/08/28/amazons-kindle-exclusive-books-surge-past-100-million-mark/>.
97. According to the Authors Guild, average revenue for authors has fallen by about one-quarter since 2009. Letter from Authors United, *supra* note 95.
98. See Owen, *supra* note 67.
99. George Packer, *Cheap Words*, New Yorker, Feb. 17, 2014, at <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/02/17/cheap-words>.
100. Michael Naumann, *How Germany Keeps Amazon at Bay and Literary Culture Alive*, Nation, May 29, 2012, at <https://www.thenation.com/article/how-germany-keeps-amazon-bay-and-literary-culture-alive/> ("In Germany, approximately 90,000 new books are published each year, which per capita is about four times as many as in the United States. . . . Additionally, average book prices in Germany are the lowest in Europe, with the possible exception of Iceland and Finland."). See also Stacy Mitchell, *Why Publishers, Not Amazon, Should Set Book Prices*, Institute for Local Self Reliance (June 23, 2011), <https://ilsr.org/why-publishers-not-amazon-should-set-book-prices/>.
101. Packer, *supra* note 99.
102. Ylan Q. Mui and Hayley Tsukayama, *Justice Department Sues Apple, Publishers over E-book Prices*, Wash. Post, April 11, 2012, at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/justice-department-files-suit-against-apple-publishers-report-says/2012/04/11/gIQAZyXSAT_story.html.
103. David Carr, *Book Publishing's Real Nemesis*, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2012, at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/business/media/amazon-low-prices-disguise-a-high-cost.html?_r=1&ref=books.
104. Lauren Indvik, *Amazon Beating Google as First Stop for Shoppers*, Mashable, July 26, 2012, <http://mashable.com/2012/07/26/amazon-beating-google-shopping/#vkZF2A9Gskqm>.
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107. Items offered by third-party sellers account for over forty percent of everything the company sells. Amazon.com, Inc., *supra* note 94.
108. Greg Bensinger, *Competing with Amazon on Amazon: Small Retailers Need the Site to Reach Millions of Shoppers but Some Say Behemoth Swoops In on Hits*, Wall St. J., June 27, 2012, at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304441404577482902055882264>; Amy Martinez, *Amazon Sellers Complain of Tied-Up Payments*, Account Shutdowns, Seattle Times, Nov. 17, 2012, at <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0ahUKEWjG2risg4LOAhUlBz4KHZmnC3gQFggIMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.seattletimes.com%2Fbusiness%2Famazon-sellers-complain-of-tied-up-payments-account-shutdowns%2F&usq=AFQjCNEMsfrydOK6oc0eoMiARh1e0Q-NYQ&cad=rja>; Barney Jopson, *From Warehouse to Powerhouse: Once Just a Bookseller, the Company Provides Vital Logistics for Many but It Seems Set to Face Sterner Political Scrutiny*, Fin. Times, July 8, 2012, at <https://next.ft.com/content/cc3a0eee-c1de-11e1-8e7c-00144feabd0>.
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